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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to show that there are patterns 
to the behavior of Islamist groups that eventually resort 
to separatist violence against the state.  The goal of the 
thesis is to create a framework illustrating certain 
indicators, or signs, that may indicate if or when acts of 
violence against the state will take place.  The primary 
audience for the framework are military regional affairs 
officers (RAO). 
Today, Islamic separatist violence is an ongoing 
phenomenon in several regions of the world and can have 
severe security and humanitarian implications that affect 
the entire region.  RAOs are particularly concerned about 
the possible international repercussions: military and 
political involvement from nearby states, instigation of 
similar secessionist movements in neighboring states, or 
the creation of international refugees. 
This thesis reviews the popular literature on ethnic, 
separatist, and religious violence and draws on the 
potential indicators of violence described in the 
literature.  The relevance of each indicator is validated 
through two case studies involving Islamic separatist 
movements: the Filipino Muslims in the Southern Philippines 
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This thesis seeks to show that regular patterns exist 
for Islamist groups that resort to separatist violence 
against the state.1  The goal of the thesis is to create a 
framework of indicators that could determine when or if 
such violence will take place.2  The primary audience for 
the framework are military regional affairs officers; 
however, the framework could be equally useful to 
researchers and scholars alike.3 
 
B. IMPORTANCE 
In a 2005 report, the Center for International 
Development and Conflict highlights the spread of violence 
in Muslim countries as a troublesome trend.  Fourteen of 
the twenty-four major armed conflicts in early 2005 
                     1 In this thesis, the term “Islamist” means “individuals, groups, 
organizations, and parties that see in Islam a guiding political 
doctrine that justifies and motivates collective action on behalf of 
that doctrine…Islamists are Muslims who feel compelled to act on the 
belief that Islam demands social and political activism, either to 
establish an Islamic state, to proselytize to reinvigorate the 
faithful, or to create a separate union for Muslim communities”  
(Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the 
Islamic World [Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003], 4).  
For further clarification, “Islam” refers to the religion, “Muslims” 
refers to the followers of Islam, “Islamic” describes things related to 
Islam, “Islamism” refers to political movements based on Islam, and, 
lastly, all Islamists are Muslims, but only a tiny percentage of 
Muslims are Islamists (Jillian Schwedler, "Islamic Identity: Myth, 
Menace, or Mobilizer?" SAIS Review 21, no. 2 [2001], 5). 
2 See Appendix A. 
3 See Appendix B for the description and duties of a Regional Affairs 
Officer for each of the branches of the US armed forces. 
2 
involved Muslim groups.4  Five of the six armed conflicts 
that emerged in 2005 involved Muslim countries or Muslim 
groups.  Ted Gurr’s extensive study of 227 politicized 
communal groups in conflict in 1990 found that of the 49 
groups politicized by religion, 39 were Muslim groups.5  
These trends are particularly important to military 
regional affairs officers whose purpose is to make country 
and regional threat assessments and to recommend force 
protection levels.  No framework of violence indicators 
currently exists to assist in such assessments of Islamist 
groups. 
For this thesis, Islamist separatist violence was 
specifically chosen because it is an ongoing phenomenon in 
several regions of the world and, more important, because 
separatist violence can have severe security and 
humanitarian implications that affect entire regions.6  
Military regional affairs officers are particularly 
concerned about the international repercussions of 
separatist violence, which may include military and 
political involvement from nearby states, the instigation 
                     4 Ted Robert Gurr, Monty G. Marshall, and University of Maryland 
Center for International Development and Conflict Management, Peace and 
Conflict, 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination 
Movements, and Democracy (College Park, Md.: Center for International 
Development and Conflict Management, 2005), 6, 79-83. 
5 See, for example, Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global 
Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945," 
International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De 
Science Politique 14, no. 2 (April 1993), 165-66. 
6 The Gurr et al. report, Peace and Conflict 2005, highlights twenty-
four major armed conflicts in early 2005.  Three involved Islamist 
separatist groups: the Kashmiri Muslims in India, the Moros in the 
Philippines, and the Chechens in Russia.  Additionally, the report 
highlighted violence by two Islamist separatist groups: the Malay 
Muslims in Thailand and the Uigher Muslims in China.  Interestingly, 
all eight of these groups are non-Arab Islamist groups in non-Arab 
secular states.  The report found no instances in 2005 of separatist 
violence by Arab Islamist groups. 
3 
of similar secessionist movements in neighboring states, 
and the creation of international refugees.7 
 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a vast amount of literature on ethnic 
violence and separatist violence and some literature on 
violence by Islamist groups, but none that tailors the 
issue of Islamist separatist violence within a framework 
could be easily applied by military regional affairs 
officers.  The literature offers many plausible indicators, 
but no single theory or group of theories that best 
explains the phenomenon of Islamist separatist violence.  
Based on their causal relationships, the theories are 
categorized as primordialism, instrumentalism, or 
constructivism.  This literature review will discuss select 
theories from each of these three schools of thought and 
will highlight indicators of Islamist separatist violence 
that are applicable to this research.  The theories were 
chosen according to their applicability to the issue of 




The primordialist view identifies two main causes of 
ethnic violence: inherent ethnic tensions and a desire to 
protect the group identity.  According to primordialists, 
some of the recent ethnic separatist violence can be 
attributed to long-standing ethnic hatreds that were 
rekindled after the removal of the stability, which they 
                     7 Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World 
Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 19. 
4 
see as artificial, imposed by the bi-polar Cold War.8  A 
classic example is the ethnic violence that erupted in the 
former Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War.  According 
to the primordialist theory, ethnic violence occurred in 
the Balkans because the Bosnians, the Croats, and the Serbs 
have always hated one another and always will, even though 
they lived together peacefully under Yugoslavian rule.  
Primordialists trace this ancient hatred back to the Battle 
of Kosovo in 1389.9  While the facts surrounding the battle 
have become blurred and lost over time, the primordialists 
argue that after six centuries, the battle continues to be 
the basis for the primordialist ancient hatred explanation 
between these groups. 
The main weakness of primordialism is that its 
definition of ethnicity as historically fixed fails to 
account for either the evolution or the creation of 
identity over time as the result of formative forces such 
as power struggles among group leaders.  Primordialism 
leaves little latitude for changes in identity.10  To 
demonstrate this weakness, David Horowitz proposed a 
simplistic, primordialist theory that proposes that 
deprived ethnic groups on the periphery of a state will 
                     8 See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign 
Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), 25; Donald L. Horowitz, "The Cracked 
Foundations of the Right to Secede," Journal of Democracy 14, no. 2 
(2003), 6-7; and Michael E. Brown, “Ethnic and Internal Conflict: 
Causes and Implications,” in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of 
Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler 
Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 2001), 209. 
9 For more details see Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey 
through History (New York: Vintage books, 1994), 35-41. 
10 Ashley J. Tellis, Thomas S. Szayna, James A. Winnefeld, and Arroyo 
Center, Anticipating Ethnic Conflict (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 
1997), 66. 
5 
resort to secession regardless of the costs.11  The 
proposition totally negates the affects of group or state 
leaders and relegates the group to inevitable violence. 
Clifford Geertz focuses on ethnic conflicts that tend 
to arise in new multi-ethnic states, such as India in 1948.  
He attributes such ethnic violence to the psychological 
differences between ethnic groups, for example, family 
(blood) ties, race, language, region, religion, and 
customs.12  These qualities may create an undeniable bond or 
corporate oneness that supersedes loyalty to the state.  
Hence, “disaffection based on race, language or culture 
threatens partition."13 
Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis cite religious 
differences as a primary source of conflict.  Huntington 
discusses religion as the most divisive factor in the clash 
of civilizations.14  Lewis powerfully highlights the 
humiliation felt by Muslims who are ruled by misbelievers 
or non-Muslims as blasphemous and unnatural.15  Both find a 
link between religious differences and conflict. 
There are four indicators evident in the primordialist 
literature that are applicable to this research.  Horowitz 
                     11 Donald L. Horowitz, "Patterns of Ethnic Separatism," Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 23, no. 2 (April 1981), 167, 192-94. 
12 Geertz uses the term “region” to describe geographically 
heterogeneous or geographically separated areas such as the Indonesian 
archipelago and the former East and West Pakistans, respectively 
(Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution,” in Old Societies and 
New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, ed. Clifford 
Geertz, 106-57 [New York: The Free Press, 1963], 113).  Geertz bases 
race on physical features such as skin color, facial form, stature, 
hair type, etc. (Ibid., 112). 
13 Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution,” 111. 
14 Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" 25. 
15 Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic 266, no. 3 
(September 1990), 54. 
6 
discusses two, cultural revival and proportionate 
representation.  A cultural revival implies that an ethnic 
group may be building an ethno-nationalist movement or 
reviving ethnic cleavages that existed before the current 
or former colonial rule.16  First, as it pertains to 
religion, revival is a return to the supposed fundamentals 
of a faith so as to change the society and government from 
the bottom up and create a religion-based society.17  
Second, when a state ignores an ethnic group’s demands for 
proportionate representation in politics and public 
service, the group may feel that it has no good reason to 
continue to support the state.18  Third, the societal 
alienation of an ethnic group because it differs racially, 
linguistically, or culturally from the dominant group may 
lead to violence.  Lastly, conflict is more likely to 
result when a group’s religion is different than the 
religion of the government, the official state religion. 
 
2. Instrumentalism 
The instrumentalist view attributes ethnic violence to 
“the use or manipulation of ethnic identity in the pursuit 
of material and political objectives.”19  A group of ethnic 
elites can influence the sentiments of the entire ethnic 
group in competition against the state.  This rivalry can 
take the form of competition over resources, economic 
issues, political rights, autonomy, and even territory.  
One example of the instrumentalist theory of ethnic 
                     16 Horowitz, "Cultural Movements and Ethnic Change," 8-13. 
17 John L. Esposito, "Religion and Global Affairs: Political 
Challenges." SAIS Review 18, no. 2 (1998), 23-24. 
18 Horowitz, "Patterns of Ethnic Separatism," 192. 
19 Gurr and Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, 191. 
7 
violence would be when ethnic elites motivate the masses to 
fight for independence against their colonial rulers.20  The 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is another example.  Leading up 
to the massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus, militant Hutu 
elites generated anti-Tutsi messages intended to emphasize 
Hutu ethnicity as superior and the Tutsi ethnicity as sub-
human.21 
One of the weaknesses of instrumentalism is that it 
fails to “explain how elites can convince their followers 
to adopt false beliefs and take actions that the followers 
would not want.”22  In other words, instrumentalism does not 
fully explain why followers follow.  In addition, the 
notion of elites manipulating a group’s identity underplays 
the durability and attractive power of culture, tradition, 
and history as the bases of identity. 
Writing separately, Michael Brown and Ted Gurr agree 
that there are antecedent conditions that prime an ethnic 
group for political mobilization and potential violence.  
Brown organizes these conditions into four categories: 
structural: weak states, intrastate security concerns, and 
ethnic geography; political: discriminatory political 
institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, intergroup 
politics, and elite politics; socio-economic: economic 
problems, discriminatory economic systems, and economic 
development and modernization; and cultural: patterns of 
cultural discrimination and problematic group histories.23  
                     20 Gurr, “Why Minorities Rebel,” 161-62. 
21 Peter Uvin, "Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide in Rwanda," African 
Studies Review 40, no. 2 (September 1997), 109-111. 
22 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Violence and the Social 
Construction of Ethnic Identity," International Organization 54, no. 4 
(Autumn 2000), 853. 
23 Brown, “Ethnic and Internal Conflict,” 214. 
8 
Gurr explains the conditions as persistent grievances over 
relative deprivation, where relative deprivation is “a 
situation of perceived discrepancy between value 
expectations and value expectancies in a society.”24  In 
both theories, these conditions lead to a situation in 
which the state’s continued neglect makes an ethnic group 
vulnerable to elite manipulation. 
Four significant indicators of possible or probable 
violence emerge from the instrumentalist literature.  
First, when a repressed ethnic group perceives new state 
policies as merely a continuance of the existing political 
or economic discrimination or as an unequal economic 
opportunity, then the probability of violence increases.25  
Second, an ethnic group that has used violence in the past 
is more likely to use it again when there is an expansion 
of state power that threatens the group’s political rights.  
Third, if a Muslim group has ties to a similar Muslim group 
elsewhere that has successfully used violence to achieve 
its goals, the former group is more likely to also use 
violence.26  Fourth, a state’s use of violence by the state 
against an ethnic group is an indicator that the group will 
respond in kind. 
 
3. Constructivism 
The constructivist approach is unique in that it views 
ethnicity as a socially constructed identity, that is, an 
identity based on human actions and choices, and thus, one 
that can change over time.  The constructivist view of the 
                     24 Tellis et al., Anticipating Ethnic Conflict, 293. 
25 Brown, “Ethnic and Internal Conflict,” 217-19. 
26 Gurr, "Why Minorities Rebel," 189. 
9 
causes of ethnic violence not only incorporates both the 
primordialist theory of ancient hatreds and the 
instrumentalist theory of elite manipulation, but also 
attributes ethnic violence to either a group’s alienation 
from or the weakening of social or state institutions.27  
The fall of the multi-ethnic state of Yugoslavia between 
1987 and 1991 can be considered an example of the 
constructivist theory of ethnic violence.28 
In 1987, the new Yugoslav president, Slobodan 
Milosevic, rallied Serbians to support nationalism on the 
grounds of certain historical injustices.  However, the 
nationalist rhetoric alienated the Slovene and Croat 
members of the nation.  During the economic collapse and 
the breakdown of the Yugoslav state, the terms “Muslim,” 
“Serb,” and “Croat” became highly politicized and markers 
of potential violence.29 
Another example is the post-Cold War security dilemma 
that altered the balance of global power relations, forcing 
states and ethnic groups to compete for power.30  One 
shortcoming of constructivism is that it can be overly 
subjective in explaining the basis, formation, and 
importance of ethnic identity.31 
                     27 Brown, “Ethnic and Internal Conflict,” 211. 
28 Earlier in this chapter, Yugoslavia was used as an example for the 
primordialist school of thought.  This dichotomy of examples shows that 
neither school of thought is necessarily correct or better than the 
other, but that the schools of thought can be used to explain the same 
situation in different ways. 
29 Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and Ethnic Identity Construction,” 
858, 867. 
30 Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and Ethnic Identity Construction,” 
855; and David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The 
Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," International Security 21, 
no. 2 (Autumn 1996), 43-44. 
31 Jessica Piombo, “Elite Manipulation” (Lecture, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, Calif., April 11, 2006). 
10 
In his book Why Muslims Rebel, Mohammed Hafez offers a 
constructivist theory of Islamist violence.  Hafez 
theorizes that socio-economic deprivation and cultural 
alienation will lead some Muslims to use Islam as a form of 
political mobilization, thus making them Islamists.  If the 
state responds to Islamists with institutional exclusion 
and repression then a select group of these Islamists will 
further transform their identity by forming exclusive 
radical Islamist organizations that espouse anti-state 
ideologies.32  The final outcome is usually ethnic 
separatist violence.33 
There are three indicators of violence in the 
constructivist literature that are applicable to this 
research.  The constructivists focus on the actions of 
Islamists, radical Islamists, and radical Islamist elites, 
each group being a subset of the preceding group.  The 
likelihood of violence increases when any of the following 
conditions occur: a group transforms into a radical 
Islamist organization with anti-state ideologies; a group 
justifies hatred or violence toward other Muslims or 
Islamists; or group elites seek to purify the culture or 
                     32 Hafez defines “radical” Islamists as “those who reject 
accommodation with the state regime, refuse to participate in its 
institutions, and insist on the necessity of violent revolution or mass 
mobilization to Islamize society and politics” (Hafez, Why Muslims 
Rebel, 5).  In contrast, the adjective “moderate” describes Islamists 
who “shun violence and insurgency as a strategy to effect social change 
and, instead, seek to work through state institutions, civic 
associations, or nonviolent organizations to Islamize society and 
politics” (ibid., 5).  To Hafez, “radical Islamists” are a subset of 
“Islamists,” a term that includes "individuals, groups, organizations, 
and parties that see in Islam a guiding political doctrine that 
justifies and motivates collective action on behalf of that doctrine" 
(ibid., 4). 
33 Ibid., 21-22. 
11 
alter the social content of the group as a whole.34  While 
an explanation of when and why these conditions occur is 
beyond the scope of this research, they are, nonetheless, 
useful indicators of potential violence. 
 
4. Overall Literature Assessment 
Eleven prominent independent variables emerge in the 
literature that portend the likelihood of an Islamist group 
resorting to separatist violence against the state.  These 
variables were selected for three reasons.  First, the 
focus of the framework is to produce a narrative model for 
the target audience that is free of complex statistical 
analyses.  Second, variables were chosen based on their 
potential causality of violence and anticipatory capacity.  
Third, the selection sought a combination of state, group, 
and policy-oriented indicators so as to capture a wide 
range of political, economic, social, and cultural aspects 
of the situation. 
For the purposes of this framework, therefore, the 
eleven independent variables are indicators of a 
situation’s conflict potential.  The indicators are 
categorized as three groups: preconditions, signals, and 
catalytic events.  The “preconditions” comprise indicators 
that exist prior to a group’s separatist violence against 
the state.  They are the necessary conditions required for 
violence to occur but their existence does not guarantee 
future violence.  The “signals” are indicators whose 
emergence increases the likelihood of violence but are not 
in and of themselves triggers of violence.  The “catalytic 
events” are indicators that trigger either immediate or 
                     34 Fearon and Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic 
Identity," 865. 
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impending violence.  Table 1 categorizes the eleven 
indicators and illustrates their value and anticipated 
influence on the propensity for violence. 
 
Indicator Description Values Propensity 
for Violence 
Preconditions:    
1. Political 
Representation 
The degree of proportionate 












The degree of societal alienation of the 
group from the dominant group of the 
state caused by differences in language, 
race, culture, religion, or education. 
-High on all factors 
-Varying on multiple factors 




3. Past Use of 
Violence 
The group’s use of violence in the past 











Signals:    








7. Group Justification 
of Violence 
Group justification of hatred or violence 







8. Group Purification Group elites seek to purify or alter the 





9. Link to Violent 
Islamists 
Link to similar Islamist groups elsewhere 
that have successfully used violence to 







Catalytic events:    
10. Perception of 
New State Policies 






11. State Use of 
Violence 
State use of violence targeted at specific 
individuals or indiscriminately against 










Table 1.   Potential Indicators of Violence 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis uses a case-study methodology—more 
specifically, process tracing—to test the importance of the 
13 
eleven indicators.  Two case studies have been selected for 
this thesis: the Filipino Muslims in the Southern 
Philippines and the Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand.  
These case studies were chosen because of their similar 
dependent variable.  Both case studies had positive values 
on the dependent variable; in both case studies, Islamist 
separatist violence occurred against the state. 
Comparing these case studies provided a means to test 
the importance of the eleven indicators.  It also provided 
an opportunity to highlight other indicators not identified 
by the theories examined in the literature review.  
Indicators present in both case studies had the greatest 
importance for the thesis framework.  Likewise, indicators 
present in only one of the case studies could be eliminated 
from the framework of indicators of Islamist separatist 
violence against the state. 
 
E. MEASURING THE INDICATORS OF VIOLENCE 
The case studies seek to determine whether any of the 
eleven indicators were present.  If an indicator was 
evidenced in a study, then the case study tried to 
determine whether there was a direct relationship between 
the indicator and any propensity for violence.  This 
section describes how to determine the presence of each 
indicator. 
 
1. Political Representation 
The determination of the presence and extent of 
political representation as an indicator of potential 
violence is a purely objective process.  It is based on a 
given group’s percentage of the population either in a 
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specific region or in the entire country, or both, 
depending on the political system.  In this process, both 
elected and government-appointed political positions—for 
example, cabinet members and provincial governors—are 
considered, because both are forms of political 
representation.  To measure this indicator, compare the 
population demographics of the country and individual 
regions to the demographics of the elected and government-
appointed national and regional officials. 
 
2. Societal Alienation 
The determination of societal alienation as an 
indicator of potential violence begins with the assumption 
that it is not caused by differences in language, race, 
culture, religion, or education, in and of themselves.  
Rather, societal alienation is assumed caused by the 
negative affects of those differences on the interaction 
between the dominant group and a given subject group in the 
society under discussion.  Specifically, it is the subject 
group’s perceptions of the interactions that provide a true 
measure of this violence indicator. 
For example, if a group perceives the linguistic 
differences between it and the dominant group in the 
society as a barrier between them, societal alienation will 
result, whether the language differences are actually a 
barrier or not.  To measure this indicator, determine what 
differences exist in the language, race, culture, religion, 
and education between the dominant group and the Muslim 
group; and how these differences preclude Muslims from the 
rights or privileges of the dominant group.  Determine if 
laws prohibit expression of the Muslims’ identity.  For 
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example, are headscarves illegal to wear or is the Muslims’ 
native language prohibited in public?  Determine if Muslims 
are excluded from higher education because of requirements 
not readily obtainable, for example, fluency of the 
dominant group’s language.  Lastly, to confirm racial 
discrimination, determine if non-Muslims of the same race 
as the Muslim group face discrimination based on their 
shared physically appearance.  When available, public 
opinion poll data provides evidence of the actual 
perceptions of alienation. 
 
3. Past Use of Violence 
Measuring this indicator is an objective process that 
is based on a group’s past behavior in the society under 
discussion.  The central question here is whether the group 
has taken responsibility for a violent action in the past 
or been reasonably suspected of violence.  To measure this 
indicator, look at past incidences of violence against the 
state, and ask: How recent is the use of violence?  Was it 
intended?  What degree of violence was used?  For suspected 
incidences of violence, seek out unbiased sources of 
information whenever possible. 
 
4. State Regime Type 
Measuring the state regime type is not a binary 
process, because exclusive and inclusive state regimes 
share commonalities.  The dividing line between the two is 
a subjective decision.  An exclusive state regime lacks 
competitive elections, prohibits the right to assembly, 
restricts or censors the media, lacks the ability to check 
executive power, and has weak or nonexistent forms of 
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tolerance.  An inclusive state regime has competitive 
elections free from fraud or intimidation and peaceful 
transitions of power, allows the right to assembly, does 
not restrict or censor the media, limits executive power, 
and has tolerance norms.35  To measure this indicator, 
determine the existence or absence of these indicated 
qualities.  Tolerance norms are evident by the effort 
expended by the government to exclude or include certain 
groups in the political process.36  For example, the absence 
or presence of an Islamist political party would be one 
indication of a government’s tolerance efforts. 
 
5. Religious Revival 
Determining whether a religious revival has taken 
place is an objective process that can be difficult to 
measure.  A religious revival is a group’s return to what 
it perceives as the fundamentals of its professed religion 
in order to seek changes in society and government from 
below.  The group’s ultimate purpose is to create a 
religion-based society.  Religious revivalists seek a self-
defining identity, political and social authenticity, and 
community.  They fault the impact of colonialism, the 
injustice of despotic governments, the entrenched elites, 
and, often, the religious establishment.  They seek a 
return to the foundation or cornerstones of faith; 
emphasize the primacy of divine sovereignty and the 
equality of all within the community; and see religion as a 
total way of life.37  The ideal situation for measuring this 
                     35 Tellis et al., Anticipating Ethnic Conflict, 51. 
36 Ibid., 42. 
37 Esposito, "Religion and Global Affairs," 21-24. 
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indicator is the existence of scholarly literature on the 
religious revivalism of a subject group.  Lacking such 
literature, such measurement can be based on newspaper 
articles, speeches by group leaders, or communiqués from 
the group. 
 
6. Group Ideology 
The adjectives “radical” and “moderate,” often used to 
describe an ideology adopted by a group, comprise a 
straightforward binary measurement.  Islamist groups with a 
radical ideology, for example, work outside the political 
system, use inflammatory anti-state rhetoric, and engage in 
violence and terror in order to destabilize or overthrow 
the government.  Groups with a moderate ideology work 
within the political system, form legitimate political 
parties, and, possibly, espouse the de-secularization of 
society as social and political activists.38 
 
7. Group Justification for Violence 
Confirming the existence of this indicator requires 
some proof that the group in question condones either 
hatred or violence, or both, against other Muslims or 
Islamists.  Other Muslims and Islamists are broken out from 
the general population because hatred or violence justified 
against these religiously and ideologically like-minded 
groups indicates that the group will let no obstacles stand 
between it and its goal.  This indicator is evidenced by 
speeches from group leaders or communiqués from the group.   
 
 
                     38 Esposito, "Religion and Global Affairs," 19. 
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Easy access to weapons heightens the probability that a 
group’s justification of violence is an indicator of 
potential violence. 
 
8. Group Purification 
Group purification is a process in which a group 
narrows its membership to include only those who share the 
group ideology and level of commitment.  It is a signal 
that the group is becoming narrowly exclusive.  Inclusive 
organizations have loose membership requirements, require 
less dedication, and impose few commitments on their 
members.  An exclusive organization has strict membership 
requirements, imposes a high level of discipline, requires 
a great deal of personal commitment, and “permeates all 
sections of the member’s life, including activities with 
non-members.”39  Measuring this indicator is largely 
dependent on published interviews with current or former 
group members or leaders, or scholarly literature or 
intelligence reports on the subject group. 
 
9. Link to Violent Islamists 
There are a number of ways that an Islamist group can 
be linked to violent Islamists.  The links can be in the 
form of financial, moral, or training support, or 
assistance in the execution of violent acts.  In these 
cases, the propensity for violence increases as the breadth 
and depth of support increases.  Such links can be 
discovered and demonstrated by researching news coverage, 
media assessments, interrogation reports, and interviews of 
group members.  In addition, links can be gleaned by 
                     39 Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, 109-10. 
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comparing the speeches, communiqués, tactics, and 
strategies of both the subject group and the external 
Islamist groups. 
 
10. Perception of New State Policies 
Measuring this indicator requires access to the 
subject group’s written or verbal responses to the state’s 
adoption or declaration of new policies.  Since this 
indicator is a matter of perception, its measurement hinges 
on the group leaders’ speaking out on the issues.  Without 
their publicly stated views, it may still be possible to 
gauge the opinions of the group members, but it will be 
more difficult.  Mass protests will provide ample evidence 
of this indicator. 
 
11. State Use of Violence 
The state’s use of suspected or confirmed cases of 
officially mandated violence, whether directed at specific 
members of the subject group or at random members, may 
provide ample evidence from which to measure this 
indicator.  However, suspected cases of violence should be 
considered only if the group perceives that they were 
conducted by the state.  In determining this indicator, as 
with several others, perception outweighs factuality. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter draws on the prominent literature 
pertaining to ethnic, separatist, and religious violence to 
create a framework of indicators that, in various 
combinations, may be used to determine a given Islamist 
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group’s potential for separatist violence against the 
state.  The operational definitions presented for the 
eleven indicators show various methods for measuring the 
presence and level of the indicators.  Table 1 summarizes 
the indicators and their anticipated influence on the 
overall propensity for violence. 
The next two chapters are case studies of separatist 
violence against a state.  Each case study seeks to 
determine whether any or all of the eleven indicators 
existed prior to the separatist violence against the state 
and whether there was a corresponding relationship between 
the indicators and the propensity for violence.  Each case 
study begins with a description of the historical 
background of Islam in that state to show its relevance to 
the conflict.  The case study will then analyze the 
historical outcome of the separatist violence in each case 
in terms of the framework so as to demonstrate the role of 
each indicator.  The last chapter summarizes the findings 
of the two case studies and presents a further refinement 
the framework of indicators. 
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II. CASE STUDY #1: THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: ISLAM IN THE SOUTHERN 
PHILIPPINES 
Prior to the introduction of Islam in the southern 
Philippines, the indigenous people were predominantly 
Hindus or animists.  Their social hierarchy was based along 
ancestral lines with clear divisions between unrelated 
clans or tribes.  No centralized government existed at the 
time to unify these cleavages. 
The Philippines falls along the trade routes of Arab 
merchants who traveled between India and China as early as 
the tenth century.  During their travels, the Arab 
merchants and Islamic scholars began interacting with 
communities along the coast of the Sulu archipelago (see 
Figure 1).  Their interaction led to the introduction of 
Islam in the southern Philippines.40  While it is hard to 
accurately date the establishment of the first Muslim 
community in the Philippines, Islamic graves and tombstones 
dating back to the late thirteenth and early fourteenth 
centuries have been found in the southern portion of the 
Sulu archipelago.  Those discoveries have led many scholars 
to accept that same timeframe for the introduction of Islam 
in the Philippines.41 
During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, 
Arab merchants, Malayan Muslim clerics, and Chinese Muslim 
missionaries arrived on Mindanao, the southernmost island  
                      40 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, (Oxford: Lexington 
Books, 2002), 185. 
41 Cesar Abid Majul, “The Muslims in the Philippines: An Historical 
Perspective,” in The Muslim Filipinos, ed. Peter G. Gowing and Robert 
D. McAmis, (Manila: Solidaridad, 1974), 3. 
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of the present-day Philippines.  The Muslims peacefully 
converted many local chiefs, married into local ruling 
 
  
Figure 1.   Maps of Mindanao and the Philippines 
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families, and subsequently brought entire social 
hierarchies under the influence of Islam.42 
By the middle of the fifteenth century, a Muslim 
community had emerged in Sulu and a sultanate was 
established.  The first sultan was an Arab Muslim who was 
believed to be a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed.  
Shortly thereafter, as Islam continued to spread, a 
sultanate was established in Maguindanao on the main island 
of Mindanao.  It was led by a Yemeni Muslim who was also 
believed to be a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed.43  With 
no central government to resist the expansion of the 
Sultans, Islam spread peacefully throughout Mindanao and by 
the sixteenth century was firmly established. 
The attractiveness of Islam to the people in the 
southern Philippines is attributable to two factors.  
First, the spread of Islam to other nations throughout 
Southeast Asia made commerce and political ties easier to 
establish because of their shared religion.44  Second, Islam 
offered island leaders an alternate political concept to 
that of the Hindu empire that dominated the region; it also 
offered the locals greater equality and an end to the Hindu 
caste system.45  Essentially, Islam offered a new way of 
life that combined religion, culture, behavior, and 
politics within an ideology. 
                     42 Majul, “The Muslims in the Philippines,” 4. 
43 Najeeb M. Saleeby, “History of Maguindanao,” in The Muslim 
Filipinos: Their History, Society, and Contemporary Problems, ed. Peter 
G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis (Manila: Solidaridad, 1974), 186. 
44 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 186. 
45 Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines, 
(New York: Random House, 1989), 40. 
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The impact of the spread of Islam in the southern 
Philippines is still evident today.  Islam unified various 
indigenous groups under a common ideology and created a new 
cultural identity for those who embraced it.  The 
Islamization of Mindanao generated an ideological bond that 
differentiated the Muslims from the non-Muslims on Mindanao 
and elsewhere in the country.  This differentiation has 
also prevented a bond to form between the Filipino Muslims 
and the central government.46  The religious, political, and 
historical bonds created by Islam on Mindanao still 
comprise a divisive factor in the present-day conflict 
between Muslim and Christian Filipinos. 
 
B. THE EMERGENCE OF MUSLIM SEPARATISM 
The creation of the Republic of the Philippines in 
1946 did not gain widespread acceptance among the Filipino 
Muslims, who saw themselves as culturally different from 
the Christian-dominated government.47  By the 1960s, failed 
integration efforts, a weakened central government, and a 
rising sense of Muslim consciousness among the populace 
created an environment ripe for a separatist movement.48 
Tensions between the Filipino Muslims and the 
Philippine government came to a tipping point in March 1968 
because of an incident, later known as the Jabidah 
massacre, in which the Philippine Army executed over two 
                     46 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 191. 
47 Syed Serajul Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani 
of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines,” Asian Survey 38, no. 5 
(May 1998), 445-46. 
48 Lela Garner Noble, “The Philippines: Autonomy for the Muslims,” in 
Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, and Society, ed. John L. Esposito 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 98. 
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dozen Muslim recruits on Corregidor Island.49  As a 
consequence of this massacre, in May 1968, a former 
provincial governor of Cotabato, Udtog Matalam, announced 
the formation of the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) and 
issued a manifesto demanding the independence of Sulu, 
Palawan, and much of Mindanao.  An underground movement 
within the youth section of MIM would eventually go on to 
form the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1969.  In 
an interview in 1974, an MNLF commander gave three causes 
for the formation of the MNLF: "The Corregidor Massacre, 
land grabbing, and the disappointment of the broad masses 
toward government failure to solve social, political and 
most of all, economic problems.”50 
While the MNLF initially demanded autonomy and Islamic 
law for the Muslim regions of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan; 
in April 1974 the MNLF issued an official manifesto that 
advocated armed struggle to achieve an independent Moro 
nation, covering an area that consisted of Mindanao, Sulu, 
and Palawan.  Though Islam was central to their cause, the 
MNLF based its ideology on a nationalistic “Moro” identity 
that encompassed both Muslims and non-Muslims who lived in 
the Moro homeland and who embraced the Moro revolution.  
The MNLF’s desired goal was to establish a Moro nation “to 
uphold the culture of Islam in its homeland and to develop 
it without prejudice against other religions or indigenous 
cultures.”51 
                     49 For a more detailed description of this incident, see Lela Garner 
Noble, “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines,” Pacific 
Affairs 49, no. 3 (Autumn 1976), 407-8. 
50 Noble, “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines,” 
409. 
51 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 277. 
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In September 1972, in response to widening law and 
order problems, the Christian-dominated government declared 
martial law in the southern Philippines.52  This was 
followed by four years of violent conflict between 
government forces and the MNLF which resulted in an 
estimated 120,000 deaths.53  Cease-fire negotiations between 
the government and the MNLF magnified the ideological 
differences that existed among the MNLF leaders and by 1978 
resulted in the fracture of the MNLF into three factions.54 
One of the splinter factions eventually founded the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984.  The MILF 
adopted a more moderate and conciliatory approach than the 
MNLF and sought to establish an independent Islamic state 
under Islamic law for the Moro nation.  The leaders of MILF 
were mostly Islamic scholars who emphasized an Islam-
oriented ideology that appealed to more fundamentalist 
Muslims.  In 1991, an even more radical Islamic separatist 
group splintered away from the MNLF.  The Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG), like the MILF, advocates an independent Islamic 
state under Islamic law but, unlike the MILF, it refuses to 
negotiate with the Philippine government and espouses 
“violent religious intolerance, advocating the deliberate 
targeting of all southern Filipino Catholics (including the 
beheading of women, children, and the elderly).”55 
                     52 Ronald E. Dolan, Philippines: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: 
Library of Congress, 1991), http://countrystudies.us/Philippines/28.htm 
(accessed on April 19, 2007). 
53 Peter M. Sales, “War in Mindanao,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, 
(October-November 2000), 8, 10. 
54 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 269-70 and 311-12. 
55 Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in 
Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 
24, no. 4 (July 2001), 248. 
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Since the late 1980s, the MILF has regularly clashed 
with Filipino army and police units.  Its first act of 
separatist violence against the state was in January 1987 
when three hundred MILF guerillas attacked fourteen 
government installations in five provinces of Mindanao in 
what was described as the worst outbreak of Muslim violence 
since 1977.  The guerillas burned buildings, destroyed 
bridges, cut power lines, and attempted to attack Mindanao 
State University.  Thirty-four people were killed during 
the five-day long offensive.56  MILF violence peaked in May 
2000, with simultaneous attacks on several towns on 
Mindanao that resulted in dozens of civilian deaths.  
Shortly after President Gloria Arroyo came to office in 
2001, the Philippine government and the MILF entered peace 
talks and signed a ceasefire agreement.  However, this 
agreement was short-lived and the Philippine government and 
MILF forces continue to clash today. 
Instances of violence by ASG have been much more 
severe and frequent.  Since their founding, they have been 
responsible for hundreds of violent acts including deadly 
village attacks, tourist kidnappings and killings, 
bombings, and high-profile assassination attempts.  The 
most deadly attack by the ASG was the bombing of a 
Philippine ferry boat on February 27, 2004, which resulted 
in 116 deaths.  ASG attacks continue until the present day. 
 
C. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
This case study will focus on the MILF starting form 
its formative years in 1978 until its first attack against 
                     56 “Aquino Offers Talks to Moslem Rebels,” Chicago Tribune, January 
17, 1987. 
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government targets on Mindanao in January 1987.  The 
creation of the MILF is significant because it represents a 
clear shift in the ideology of the separatist movement, 
from the ethno-nationalist ideology of the MNLF to the 
religious-based ideology of the MILF.  This case study will 
not focus on the ASG because it was formed after the focus 
period of the case study. 
Political Representation.  Historically, Filipino 
Muslims have long been under-represented in politics.  
Since the time of Spanish colonialism, Christian-dominated 
governments in the Philippines have sought to control and 
convert the Filipino Muslims.57  Even educated Muslim elites 
were denied the opportunity “to become part of the ruling 
political elite in their region nor were any administrative 
jobs open to them.”58 
In 1972, President Marcos declared martial law and 
dissolved the Senate and House of Representatives.  During 
martial law, political power was centralized in an almost 
exclusively Christian-dominated government, and legitimate 
political activity was reduced to mere acceptance of the 
regime and its promises.59  Although some datus (the 
traditional Filipino Muslim aristocracy) collaborated with 
the martial law regime and gained strength in local Muslim 
                     57 Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia,” 247. 
58 Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand 
and Mindanao of the Philippines,” 453. 
59 Syed Serajul Islam, “Ethno-communal Conflict in the Philippines: 
The Case of Mindanao-Sulu Region,” in Ethnic Conflict & Secessionism in 
South & Southeast Asia, ed. Rajat Ganguly and Ian Macduff, 195-224 (New 
Dehli: Sage Publications, 2003), 203. 
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politics, their fellow Filipino Muslims did not view them 
as their legitimate representatives.60 
With the resumption of Parliamentary elections in 
1978, Filipino Muslim politicians, one of which was a 
member of the Mindanao Alliance Party, won six of the one 
hundred and eighty-three seats.  All six represented 
districts on Mindanao.  Filipino Muslims also won six of 
the thirty-five seats on Mindanao, which closely 
approximates the percentage of Filipino Muslims on the 
island.61 
Follow-on parliamentary elections in 1984 nearly 
mirrored the percentages in 1978.  Filipino Muslims won six 
of the one hundred and eighty-one seats; one was a member 
of the Mindanao Alliance Party.62  Although Filipino Muslims 
gained some political representation during the time frame 
of this case study, there are three factors that 
substantiate their underrepresentation in politics.  First, 
most of the Filipino Muslim politicians were datus who had 
been co-opted by the Marcos regime and hence were viewed as 
illegitimate representatives by many Filipino Muslims.  
Second, the MNLF was “prohibited from participating in all 
elections held under the auspices of the American-supported 
                     60 Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and 
Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1998), 168-69. 
61 Official Web site of the Philippines Commission on Elections, 
www.comelec.gov.ph (accessed on April 19, 2007).  The Filipino Muslim 
population on Mindanao decreased from 75% in the early 1900s to 25% in 
1960 to less than 18% by 1990.  Nathan G. Quimpo, “Options in the 
Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive, and Stable Peace in the Southern 
Philippines,” Asian Survey 41, no. 2. (March-April 2001), 274.  
Additionally, the percentage of Muslims in the whole population was 5% 
in 1989.  Dolan, Philippines: A Country Study 
http://countrystudies.us/Philippines/28.htm (accessed on April 19, 
2007). 
62 Official Web site of the Philippines Commission on Elections, 
www.comelec.gov.ph (accessed on April 19, 2007). 
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Marcos regime.”63  Lastly, in 1979, Marcos severely limited 
the regional legislative assemblies’ powers regarding 
natural resources.  This was a major concern of the 
Filipino Muslims because Mindanao has an abundance of 
natural resources.64 
Societal Alienation.  The Filipino Muslims have been 
alienated from the main society of the Philippines dating 
back to Spanish colonialism.  This historical alienation 
was clearly evident in a memorandum that a group of 
Mindanao leaders submitted to the U.S. government prior to 
the Philippines’ independence in 1946. 
We do not want to be included in the Philippines 
Independence.  For once independence is launched, 
there will be trouble between us and the 
Christian Filipinos because from time of 
immemorial these two peoples have not lived 
harmoniously.65 
The memorandum accurately predicted the near-term future of 
the Filipino Muslims, for within “two decades after the 
Philippines became independent, Muslims in Mindanao were a 
devitalized people, their economic conditions stagnant, 
their social conditions in jeopardy, their laws and customs 
in danger of disintegrating.  Thus, the Moros [Muslims in 
Mindanao] had little choice but to resort to violence and 
to a war of attrition.”66 
                     63 Luzviminda G. Tancangco, “The Electoral System and Political 
Parties in the Philippines,” in Government and Politics of the 
Philippines, ed. Raul P. de Guzman and Mila A. Reforma (Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 98. 
64 David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Cornell 
University Press, 1988), 162-63. 
65 Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand 
and Mindanao of the Philippines,” 445-46. 
66 Islam, “Ethno-communal Conflict in the Philippines,” 219. 
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The single issue that caused the greatest alienation 
between the Filipino Muslims and the Philippine government, 
and hence the Filipino Christians, was the government’s 
population resettlement program.  Beginning in the American 
colonial period and continuing until the late 1960s, public 
land on Mindanao was offered to Filipino Christians from 
the north and to Filipino capitalists and American 
companies.  The Filipino Muslims had long considered public 
land as communal property and thus had not established 
formal ownership with the government.  As a result of this 
program, Filipino Muslim land ownership on Mindanao 
decreased from 100 percent before colonization to less than 
17 percent in 1981,67 which “created a deep sense of 
frustration in the minds of Muslims in the Mindanao and 
Sulu region.”68  The Christian-Muslim demographics on 
Mindanao mirrored this change, making the Filipino Muslims 
a minority in their traditional homeland.69 
In a 1998 interview, the long-time leader of the MILF 
accused the Philippine government of genocide, citing the 
“systematic killing of individual Muslims, group or mass 
massacres of Muslims including women, children and the 
aged, and burning Muslim houses, Mosques, [and] Madrasas.”70  
This perception was no doubt created by incidents such as 
the Jabidah massacre in 1968, the 1971 Bario Manili Mosque 
                     67 Ricardo A. David Jr., “The Causes and Prospect of the Southern 
Philippines Secessionist Movement” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2003), 55. 
68 Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand 
and Mindanao of the Philippines,” 445. 
69 Quimpo, “Options in the Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive, and 
Stable Peace in the Southern Philippines,” 274. 
70 “Interview with Sheikh Salamat Hashim,” Nida’ul Islam. 
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massacre,71 and long-running military operations on 
Mindanao.  These operations included aerial bombardments, 
large-scale ground assaults, and drunken shootouts.  One 
scholar notes that the military “probably contributed as 
much to disorder as to order because their indiscriminate 
firing and other undisciplined behavior encouraged Muslims 
to flee their lands and/or join the rebels in the hills.”72 
Religious alienation affected the educational system 
and indirectly led to great disparities in literacy rates 
between Filipino Muslims and Christians.  The American 
colonialist government adopted a secular education 
curriculum in English and replaced religious teachers in 
the Mindanao public schools with non-Muslim teachers.  The 
Filipino Muslims perceived this change as an attack on 
their religious beliefs and many refused to send their 
children to public schools, opting for religious schools 
instead, thus resulting in a high percentage of 
illiteracy.73 
Past Use of Violence.  Prior to the attack in January 
1987, the MILF as an organization had not engaged in 
separatist violence against the state.  The early years of 
                     71 During this massacre “armed “Christians” entered Manili, a barrio 
in North Cotabato, when most of the men were out working their fields; 
they summoned the remaining residents—old men, women, and children—into 
a mosque for a “peace conference” and killed at least seventy of them 
with grenades, guns, and knives.” Noble, “The Philippines,” 101. 
72 Ibid., 113. 
73 Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand 
and Mindanao of the Philippines,” 445.  In 1996, the nationwide 
literacy rate in the Philippines was 95%; whereas, the southern 
provinces included in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao ranged 
from 69-84% for an average literacy rate of 80%.  Asia/Pacific Cultural 
Centre for UNESCO, www.accu.or.jp/litdbase/literacy/wed/statis1.htm 
(accessed on May 1, 2007).  Furthermore, a 1997 education index for the 
77 provinces in the Philippines ranks 6 of the 7 worst provinces in the 
Mindanao region.  Eric Gutierrez and Saturnino Borras, Jr., The Moro 
Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected State Policies (Washington, 
D.C.: East-West Center, 2004), 21. 
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the MILF were “focused on strengthening Islamic identity 
and consciousness while developing a political community 
centered on Islam that would form the foundation for the 
struggle for an independent Bangsamoro Islamic state.”74  
However, many members of the MILF were previously members 
of the MNLF and partook in the separatist war against the 
government from 1972 to 1976.  Likewise, hundreds of MILF 
members fought alongside the Mujahedeen in the Afghan War 
in the 1980s.  Even though the MILF as an organization did 
not engage in violence against the state prior to 1987, 
many of its members had personal experience in such 
activities. 
State Regime Type.  During the timeframe of this case 
study, from 1978 to January 1987, the Philippines’ form of 
government was in transition, moving from an exclusionary 
to an inclusionary regime.  Under an exclusionary regime, 
disenfranchised groups have no legitimate means to air 
their grievances to the government and, therefore, resort 
to violence.  After enacting martial law in 1972, the 
Philippines became a purely exclusionary regime.  Curfews 
were imposed, public assemblies banned, the free press 
rescinded, protest movements outlawed, opposition parties 
arrested, and the Senate and House of Representatives 
dissolved.  A puppet assembly was created to ratify 
decrees.75  In 1978, the Philippines began to transition 
away from being an exclusionary regime, holding 
Parliamentary elections, ending martial law, and having a 
                     74 Joseph Chinyong Liow, Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and 
Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics (Washington, 
D.C.: East-West Center, 2006), 13. 
75 Dolan, Philippines: A Country Study, 
http://countrystudies.us/Philippines/28.htm (accessed on April 19, 
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Presidential election in 1981.  However, the opposition 
parties largely boycotted the 1981 presidential election 
due to the perception that corruption had occurred during 
the 1978 Parliamentary elections.  As a result of the 
boycott, the incumbent, President Marcos, was reelected by 
91 percent76.  In 1986, the Philippines’ political 
transition was almost complete, with a new, democratically 
elected president.  In 1987, Senate elections were held for 
the first time since 1972, making the form of government in 
the Philippines a fully inclusionary regime. 
Religious Revival.  The Filipino Muslims underwent a 
religious revival during the time frame of this case study.  
The worldwide revival of Islam triggered by the 1979 
Iranian Revolution, the Mujahedeen successes in the Afghan 
War against the Soviet Union, and a windfall of Middle East 
oil revenue had a profound effect on Muslims and Islam in 
the Philippines.  Middle East countries funded Islamic 
academic scholarships for Filipino Muslims on Mindanao and 
the construction of hundreds of mosques and over a thousand 
religious schools on Mindanao.77  Muslim pilgrimages to 
Mecca and academic scholarships brought more Filipino 
Muslims into direct contact with Middle East Muslims.  
“These Filipino Muslims brought back a heightened sense of 
Islamic dignity, identity, greater enthusiasm for the 
universal Islamic brotherhood and greater religious zeal.”78  
Likewise, some 3,000 Iranian students were studying in the 
                     76 Official Web site of the Philippines Commission on Elections, 
www.comelec.gov.ph (accessed on April 19, 2007). 
77 Willem Wolters, “Muslim Rebel Movements in the Southern 
Philippines: Recruitment Area for Al-Qaeda Terrorists?” Focaal, no. 40 
(2002), 157.  
78 David, “The Causes and Prospect of the Southern Philippines 
Secessionist Movement,” 57-58. 
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Philippines during the Iranian Revolution.  These students, 
as well as the Iranian Embassy, openly distributed Islamic 
literature, pamphlets, and newspapers and helped fuel 
Islamic revivalism in the Philippines.79 
The creation of the MILF is evidence of the Islamic 
revival.  The founders of the MILF broke away from the 
MNLF, proclaiming that they would follow a “more militant, 
faith-based agenda”80 and viewed the secular government as a 
threat to their Islamic way of life.  Islamic revivalism 
was also evident at the local level.  Local Muslim leaders 
on Mindanao began an effort to instill a sense of Islamic 
unity in the populace.  And local Islamic teachers preached 
political equality through religion and sought to perfect 
the peoples’ religious beliefs and practices.81 
Group Ideology.  Prior to 1986, the MILF did not have 
a radical ideology.  Its founder and leader, Salamat 
Hashim, was inspired by the Islamic scholar Syed Abul A’la 
Maududi, among others.82  Maududi was the founder and leader 
of the Jama’at-i Islami Islamist party in Pakistan, which 
achieved its goal of creating an Islamic state through 
conventional politics rather than violence.  During the 
MILF’s early years, it focused on creating a political 
community centered on Islam and the ideal of an independent 
Islamic state.  MILF members and sympathizers “increasingly 
asserted themselves in mainstream political affairs.  Urban 
                     79 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 320. 
80 International Crisis Group, “Southern Philippines Backgrounder: 
Terrorism and the Peace Process,” International Crisis Group Report 
Asia Report 80 (July 13, 2004), 4. 
81 McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels, 215, 232-3. 
82 “Interview with Sheikh Salamat Hashim,” Nida’ul Islam 23 Vol. 5 
(April-May 1998), 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/31890/20031025/www.islam.org.au/articles/
23/index.htm (accessed on April 17, 2007). 
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Muslim professionals and intelligentsia [began] campaigning 
openly through the mainstream political and civil society 
channels for the MILF’s goals.83  Thus, initially, the MILF 
generally sought to achieve its goal through the political 
system. 
Group Justification of Violence.  Notably, prior to 
1987, the MILF had not engaged in or espoused violence as a 
method for achieving its goals.  And even when it turned to 
violence during and after the 1987 attack, the MILF mostly 
engaged military targets using traditional guerilla warfare 
tactics.  It did not emphasize “indiscriminate violence 
against civilian and non-combatant targets.”84  Salamat 
often spoke of jihad but, like other moderate Islamic 
scholars, he did not emphasize the lesser jihad, known as 
jihad by the sword.  Salamat emphasized the greater jihad 
which includes jihad by the soul, jihad by the tongue, 
jihad by the pen, and jihad by the hand—that is, 
essentially, the nonviolent forms of jihad.85 
Group Purification.  The splintering of the MNLF and 
subsequent creation of the MILF is an example of group 
purification.  Before he founded the MILF, Salamat had been 
a senior leader within the MNLF.  But, in 1976, when the 
MNLF agreed to a deal for autonomy with the Philippine 
government, Salamat accused other senior MNLF leaders of 
compromising their Islamic values.  In an interview in 
1998, Salamat said that it was the MNLF’s inclination 
toward secularism and recognition of the Philippines 
                     83 Liow, Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern 
Philippines, 14. 
84 Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia,” 248. 
85 Liow, Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern 
Philippines, 16. 
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government that inspired him to lead a sizable portion of 
the MNLF membership to form a new separatist group with a 
purer, more dedicated approach to the Islamic way of life.86  
With these like-minded individuals, he then went on to form 
the MILF. 
Salamat continued the group purification process by 
recruiting thousands of Filipino Muslim youths to study 
Islam in the Middle East.  When the youths returned to 
Mindanao, “they served as Salamat's aides in the 
implementation of the MILF Islamization program and jihad 
activities in the homeland."87 
Link to Violent Islamists.  During the timeframe of 
this case study, the MILF had strong ties with violent 
Islamists outside the Philippines, namely, the Mujahedeen 
in Afghanistan and the future founder of Al Qaeda, Osama 
bin Laden.  Both Salamat and his vice-chairman for military 
affairs, Al Haj Murad, developed ties with bin Laden in the 
1980s.88  However, the MILF’s ties with the Mujahedeen run 
much deeper and broader than those with bin Laden.  While 
in college in Cairo in the 1960s, Salamat went to school 
with two of the future leaders of the Afghan Mujahedeen.  
During the 1978-1987 time frame, as Salamat lived and 
traveled between the Middle East and Pakistan, those school 
bonds were strengthened.  He arranged for up to five 
hundred MNLF and MILF guerillas to train with the 
Mujahedeen along the Afghan-Pakistan border.  Eventually, 
                     86 “Interview with Sheikh Salamat Hashim,” Nida’ul Islam. 
87 Cecil Morella, “MILF Leader Prepares for Public Life,” 
www.islamicity.com/articles/Articles.asp?ref=IV0108-1481 (accessed on 
April 22, 2007). 
88 International Crisis Group, “Southern Philippines Backgrounder,” 
4, and C.S. Kuppuswamy, “The Moro Islamic Liberation Front Imbroglio,” 
South Asia Analysis Group Paper, no. 765 (August 18, 2003), 3. 
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these guerillas made their way back to Mindanao where, in 
the late 1980s, they employed their newfound bomb-making 
skills.89 
Perception of New State Policies.  The Filipino 
Muslims have long perceived the government’s policies as 
discriminatory and unfair.  The population resettlement 
program discussed earlier had an extremely negative impact 
on the politics and economy of Mindanao.  The Filipino 
Muslims viewed this policy as deliberate political 
repression and economic exploitation.  Furthermore, in 
1972, it was rumored was rumored among Filipino Muslims 
that martial law was to have “been declared to convert 
Muslims forcibly to Christianity.”90  Between 1978 and 
January 1987, two specific government policy decisions 
stand out as unfair: the Tripoli Agreement in 1976 and the 
1986 peace talks between the Government of the Republic of 
the Philippines and the MNLF (GRP-MNLF). 
The 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed by the MNLF and the 
Philippines government, stated that the MNLF would abandon 
its quest for independence in exchange for the creation of 
an autonomous Islamic region in the southern Philippines 
that would consist of thirteen provinces and nine cities.  
After signing the agreement, however, President Marcos 
reneged and referred ratification of the agreement to a 
referendum vote whereby the residents of each province and 
city would vote for or against inclusion in the new 
Autonomous Regions in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).  The 
government knew that Christians outnumbered Muslims in most 
of these areas and, predictably, none of the cities and                      89 International Crisis Group, “Southern Philippines Backgrounder,” 
3-4, 12. 
90 Noble, “The Philippines,” 112. 
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only four provinces voted for inclusion in the ARMM.91  The 
Filipino Muslims viewed the unilateral actions of President 
Marcos and the Philippine government as deceitful and 
became suspicious of the government’s original intentions.92 
The MILF attributed its January 1987 attack to the 
Philippine government’s policy to exclude it from the 1986 
GRP-MNLF peace talks.  Dissention among the MNLF leaders 
concerning the terms of the Tripoli Agreement led to the 
creation of the MILF and a bitter competition for 
legitimacy between the two groups.  But when President 
Aquino came to power in February 1986, the MNLF and MILF 
agreed to set aside their differences and negotiate side by 
side with Aquino’s new government.93  However, in September 
of that year, Aquino met with the leader of the MNLF and 
recognized him as the sole leader of the Filipino Muslim 
separatist movement.  Not surprisingly, the MILF felt 
highly slighted by their exclusion from the peace process 
and the discussions regarding the future political 
arrangements for Mindanao.94 
State Use of Violence.  In the months leading up to 
the MILF’s January 1987 attack on Mindanao, the Philippine 
government did not commit any acts of violence against the 
Filipino Muslims or the MILF that could be categorized as a 
catalytic event.  Even though the government had (and has)  
 
                     91 Islam, “Ethno-communal Conflict in the Philippines,” 204-5. 
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a well-documented historical record of violence against 
Filipino Muslims, no previous events triggered the 1987 
attack. 
 
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Table 2, which is based on the case study of the 
Southern Philippines, summarizes the values determined for 
each indicator of potential violence, its predicted 
relationship to the propensity for violence, and its actual 
relevance to the propensity for violence.  Of the eleven 
indicators of violence, or independent variables, only six 
indicators occurred and led to the dependent variable, that 
is, the likelihood that an Islamist group would resort to 
separatist violence against the state.  Five of the 
indicators of violence did not occur and are, therefore, 
inconclusive for the purposes of this case study. 
The six indicators that occurred are Political 
Representation, Societal Alienation, Religious Revival, 
Group Purification, Links to Violent Islamists, and 
Perception of New State Policies.  The five indicators that 
did not occur are Past Use of Violence, Exclusionary State 
Regime, Radical Group Ideology, Group Justification for 





Situation in the Southern 




Relevant (+) or 
Irrelevant (-) 
1. Political Representation Under-represented High + 
2. Societal Alienation High on all factors except 
language 
High + 
3. Past Use of Violence No Low - 
4. State Regime Type Transition to an inclusionary 
regime 
Low - 
5. Religious Revival Yes High + 
6. Group Ideology Moderate Low - 
7. Group Justification of Violence Violence and hatred not 
justified 
Low - 
8. Group Purification Yes High + 
9. Link to Violent Islamists Strong Highest + 
10. Perception of New State Policies Discriminatory and unfair High + 
11. State Use of Violence None Low - 
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III. CASE STUDY #2: THAILAND 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: ISLAM IN SOUTHERN THAILAND 
The people of Southern Thailand are ethnic Malays, kin 
to the people of present day Malaysia.  In the early first 
millennia, the area of what is now southern Thailand and 
northern Malaysia was a Hindu Malay kingdom, Langkasuka, 
which in the fourteenth century became the kingdom of 
Pattani.  Before the introduction of Islam in the twelfth 
century the Malays of Pattani were Hindus and Buddhists.95 
Between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries, Arab 
merchants spread Islam throughout Malaya.  The most 
significant development occurred in 1457 when the king of 
Pattani personally converted to Islam and declared Pattani 
an Islamic state.  Shortly thereafter, Islam and Muslim 
religious leaders dominated Pattani’s institutions, 
culture, and political system.96 
In 1511, the Portuguese conquest of Malacca and the 
simultaneous rise in power of Ayutthaya (Thailand) 
forcefully brought Pattani under the Ayutthaya’s control.97  
Over the ensuing four centuries, Pattani was involved in an 
armed struggle for autonomy.  After a final military defeat 
in 1909, the kingdom was divided and incorporated into Siam 
(Thailand).98 
                     95 Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand 
and Mindanao of the Philippines,” 443. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Daniel J. Pojar Jr., “Lessons Not Learned: The Rekindling of 
Thailand’s Pattani Problem” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2005), 9-11. 
98 Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand 
and Mindanao of the Philippines,” 443. 
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Today, a violent separatist movement is taking today 
place in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand (see 
Figure 2), which trace their roots back to the Islamic 
kingdom of Pattani.  The movement began in earnest in the 
1960s with the creation of over twenty unaffiliated 
separatist groups, most notably the Pattani United 
Liberation Organization (PULO), which espoused an ethno-
nationalistic ideology and sought an independent Islamic 
state.  They were poorly organized politically and mainly 
employed mostly hit-and-run, guerilla-warfare tactics in 
the jungle against authorities of the state.  Thailand’s 
booming economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s quelled 
the violence but tensions continued to simmer. 
 
Map of Southern Thailand
 
Figure 2.   Maps of Southern Thailand and Thailand99 
                     99 The author created this figure using maps from two sources: 
http://flagspot.net and www.cia.gov (both accessed on April 7, 2007). 
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On January 4, 2004, after nearly a decade of relative 
calm, Islamic separatists in the southern provinces of 
Thailand conducted coordinated attacks by raiding an army 
arsenal and torching schools and police stations.  During 
the last three years the violence, tactics, targets, and 
nature of the conflict have escalated at an exponential 
rate, and the conflict now threatens to destabilize the 
country and possibly the region. 
 
B. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
Although the separatist groups had engaged in 
occasional violence against the state since the early 
1960s, the attack on January 4, 2004, evidences the 
dependent variable of Islamist groups engaging in 
separatist violence against the state.  This case study 
will focus predominantly on the three years leading up to 
the January 4 attack for three reasons.  First, the 
escalation of violence currently underway in Southern 
Thailand was precipitated by the government’s response and 
the insurgents’ counter-response to that attack.100  Second, 
violence during this period was sporadic and uncoordinated, 
which indicates that the Islamist groups were not yet 
committed to separatist violence against the state but were 
most likely contemplating such actions.  Lastly, the 
violence both in the 1990s and earlier was primarily ethnic 
strife, whereas the few years leading up to January 2004 
saw a distinct shift to a predominantly religious 
                     100 In the ten months after the 4 January 2004 attack, more than 900 
insurgent-related incidents occurred resulting in the deaths of over 
500 civilians and government personnel. Aurel Croissant, “Unrest in 
South Thailand: Contours, Causes, and Consequences Since 2001,” 
Strategic Insights Volume IV, Issue 2 (February 2005), 3. 
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conflict.101  The remainder of this section will assess each 
of the indicators of violence in Table 1 in the context of 
the situation in Southern Thailand.  The results are 
summarized in Table 3. 
Political Representation.  In Southern Thailand, the 
Thai Muslims are proportionately represented in elected 
positions but are severely underrepresented in government-
appointed positions.  Immediately after World War II, there 
was an “absence of political participation of Patani 
elites”102 and, continuing into the 1970s, Thai Muslims 
remained a distinct minority in the local administration.103  
In the three southern provinces of Thailand, 81 percent of 
the population is Thai Muslim, yet as many as 90 percent of 
the government administrators are Thai Buddhists.104 
Recently, Thai Muslims have served as members of 
parliament and in various government-appointed positions.105  
Since the 2001 elections, Muslim politicians have held 25 
                     101 S. P. Harish, “Ethnic or Religious Cleavage? Investigating the 
Nature of the Conflict in Southern Thailand,” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 28, no. 1 (April 2006), 48. 
102 Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand 
and Mindanao of the Philippines,” 446. 
103 Astri Suhrke, “Loyalists and Separatists: The Muslims in Southern 
Thailand,” Asian Survey 17, no. 3 (March 1977), 239. 
104 These statistics are for Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala provinces 
as of 2002.  Thailand National Statistics Office website, web.nso.go.th 
(accessed on March 14, 2007) and Bertinel Litner, “Peace stays far away 
in southern Thailand,” Asia Times, 
www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HC15Ae02.html (accessed on March 
14, 2007). 
105 Surin Pitsuwan, from Nakon Si Thammarat province in Southern 
Thailand, was elected as a Member of Parliament (MP) in 1986 and that 
same year became the Secretary to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives.  In 1988, he was appointed as the Assistant Secretary 
to the Minister of Interior.  From 1992 until 1995, he served as the 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs before becoming the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in 1997, serving in this capacity until 2001.  
Similarly, Wan Muhammad Nor Matha, an MP from Yala province in Southern 
Thailand, became speaker of the Thai Parliament, Minister of Transport, 
and later Minister of the Interior. 
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of the 600 seats106 in the parliament, or 4.2 percent 
comparable to the overall Muslim population in Thailand at 
4.75 percent.107  Forty-eight of the fifty-four members of 
parliament representing the three southern provinces of 
Thailand are from the Democratic Party.108  Unfortunately, 
party politics in Thailand negates the influence of these 
Muslim politicians and members of the Democratic Party, 
since 342 of the 600 Members of Parliament are from the 
Thai Rak Thai Party.109  Thailand is a “bureaucratic polity 
where effective political power—to protect and promote 
individual or group interests—resides in the centralized 
administration, leaving little scope of activity for the 
elected representatives or local leaders.”110  Hence, even 
if more Thai Muslims were elected or appointed to the local 
government they would not have much influence or power.  
More important, numerous sources support the notion that 
when a Thai Muslim is elected or appointed to a government 
position, that person then becomes part of the problem.111 
Societal Alienation.  In regard to societal 
alienation, major cleavages exist in all areas between the 
Thai Muslims and the dominant Thai Buddhist society.  These 
differences equate to a propensity for violence.                       106 Minorities at Risk website, www.cidcm.umd.edu (accessed on March 
14, 2007). 
107 Thailand National Statistics Office website, web.nso.go.th 
(accessed on March 14, 2007). 
108 Election Commission of Thailand website, www.ect.go.th (accessed 
on March 14, 2007). 
109 Ibid. 
110 Suhrke, “Loyalists and Separatists,” 240. 
111 Examples include Suhrke, “Loyalists and Separatists,” 246 and 
author interviews with Professors Panitan Wattanayagorn and Surachart 
Bamrungsuk at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand on 30 and 
31 January 2007, respectively.  Panitan served as an advisor to Prime 
Minister Chuan from 1997 to 2001 and Surchart served as an advisor to 
Prime Minister Thaksin from 2001 to 2005. 
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Immediately following the official incorporation of the 
Pattani provinces into Thailand in 1909, the Thai 
government embarked on a most detrimental assimilation 
policy that only highlighted the differences between the 
Thai Muslims and Thai Buddhists.  The creation of the term 
“Thai Muslim” was itself a negation of the Pattani Malay 
Muslims’ historical identity.  In addition, the 
assimilation policies enacted by Prime Minister Phibun, 
both before and after World War II, denied Thai Muslims the 
right to speak their native language, to have Muslim names, 
and to continue their cultural practices, such as wearing 
of Malay clothing or even carrying items Malay-style on 
their heads. 
What is more, the Patronage of Islam Act of 1945, and 
subsequent legislation, integrated the Islamic religious 
community into the government bureaucracy, 
institutionalized a spiritual leader appointed by the king 
for all Thai Muslims, and attempted to register all mosques 
and pondoks, the village-level religious schools in 
Southern Thailand.  Not surprisingly, the “Muslims 
perceived this centralization as government interference in 
religious affairs.”112  Religious intrusion continues to be 
a most divisive factor in the Thai Muslims’ alienation, and 
the Thai government’s continued attempts to regulate the 
pondoks are a focal point for separatist groups, because 
the pondoks are such a revered institution in the Thai 
Muslim culture.  Lastly, “the relatively low educational 
attainment of the southern Muslims makes economic 
                     112 Gunaratna, Rohan, Arabinda Acharya, and Sabrina Chua, Conflict 
and Terrorism in Southern Thailand, (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 
2005), 11. 
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advancement correspondingly difficult”113 and keeps them 
within a low socio-economic strata. 
Past Use of Violence.  Since the founding of the first 
Islamic separatist group in the 1960s, separatist groups 
have used violence intermittently against the state.  Since 
the 1970s, the PULO and other separatist groups have 
conducted religiously motivated attacks against schools, 
railway stations, and transportation nodes.  As an extreme 
example, in two roadway attacks in 1980, though both Muslim 
and Buddhist passengers were removed from the vehicles, 
only the Buddhists were killed, nine deaths in all.114  
Separatist groups also used violence against the state on 
several occasions in the three years prior to January 2004.  
Insurgents bombed a train station in Hat Yai, raided 
several law enforcement offices for weapons, and killed 
more than a dozen police officers.115  Because many of the 
police officers were killed during insurgent weapons raids, 
it is not clear whether the insurgents’ primary goal was to 
capture weapons, kill police officers, or both.  None of 
the insurgent violence before January 2004 parallels the 
brutality seen after January 2004. 
State Regime Type.  Thailand’s centralization of power 
has been a longstanding characteristic of the Thai 
monarchy, especially under the authoritarian regimes that 
ruled Thailand from 1932 to 1992, which scarcely allowed 
minority groups to express themselves politically.116  From 
                     113 Suhrke, “Loyalists and Separatists,” 241. 
114 Harish, “Ethnic or Religious Cleavage?” 56-57. 
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1932 until 1973, the military ruled Thailand and pledged 
their support and loyalty to the monarchy, the nation, and 
Buddhism as the state religion.117  Prolonged military rule 
institutionalized a sense of entitlement among the military 
officers and emboldened them to suppress any group that 
opposed their rule.  In the 1980s, Thailand began a slow 
transition to democracy when it held parliamentary 
elections.  Subsequent general elections were held in 1992, 
1995, 1996, and 2001.  The 2001 election was of pivotal 
significance because it was a multi-party election overseen 
by an independent election commission.118  Hence, as of 
2001, Thailand was an inclusive regime. 
Religious Revival.  In regard to the separatist groups 
in Southern Thailand, this research substantiates the 
existence of a relationship between a religious revival and 
the propensity for violence.  The goals of most of these 
groups are to reclaim their lost Malay Muslim identity and 
the ancient kingdom of Pattani and to establish an 
independent Islamic state under Shariah law.  These goals 
receive support from below, even down to the level of the 
individual.  There have been many Thai Muslim youths, who 
either studied Islam abroad in Muslim countries or fought 
for the Islamic cause in the Afghan War, who upon their 
return to Thailand sought a purer, more fundamental form of 
Islam to follow.  Many of these individuals became involved 
in separatist groups or became religious teachers at 
                     117 Saitip Sukatipan, “Thailand: The Evolution of Legitimacy,” in 
Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995), 196. 
118 Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of 
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pondoks where they preached distorted versions of Islam 
that espoused violence and hatred.119 
Group Ideology.  Since the formation of the first 
Muslim separatist groups in Southern Thailand, radical 
views have formed their core ideologies.  The common goal 
of these ideologies is the creation of an independent 
Islamic state formed around the ancient kingdom of Pattani; 
the common strategy is to use guerilla and terrorist 
tactics to achieve their goals.120  An example is the 
Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP), formed in 1959, 
whose objective “was complete independence and the 
establishment of an Islamic state” through the use of armed 
guerilla warfare.121 
In the last decade, many of these separatist groups 
have taken on fundamentalist ideologies.  “The rise of more 
puritanical and radical strains of Islam in southern 
Thailand is also often cited as an important contributor to 
the upsurge of violence.”122  A booklet published in August 
2002, entitled Berjihad Di Pattani, or The Fight for the 
Liberation of Pattani, illustrates this shift to radical 
ideologies clearly and specifically.123  A group of Thai 
Muslims commissioned the booklet, which is significant 
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because it is one of the few communiqués issued by Thai 
Muslim separatists.  It is a call to arms for Thai Muslims 
to rise up against the government and fight “till the last 
drop of your blood”124 to achieve an independent Islamic 
state ruled by a Muslim king and under Shariah law.  The 
booklet is believed to have been very influential and 
closely followed because it was found on the bodies of some 
insurgents killed in an attack at the Krue Se mosque on 
April 28, 2004.125 
Group Justification of Violence.  Many of the 
separatist groups have openly justified violence against 
and the killing of fellow Muslims as a means to obtain 
their goals, especially Thai Muslims who support or work 
for the government.  Thai Muslims educated in the Middle 
East in the fundamentalist Wahhabi doctrine have adopted “a 
stronger, more violent strategy of jihadist ambition aimed 
at killing infidels and non-believers.”126  This 
justification of violence has been documented throughout 
the past three decades.  In 1971 a spokesperson for the 
United Patani Freedom Movement said, “Sometimes it is 
necessary to kidnap or kill Muslims in order to show the 
people that they must work with us.”127 
Most recently, the Berjihad Di Pattani booklet extols 
violence towards fellow Muslims and justifies the killing 
of Muslim hypocrites or disbelievers, even if the 
                     124 Gunaratna and others, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern 
Thailand, 118. 
125 Ibid., 9.  See Ibid. 24-27 for a detailed description of this 
event. 
126 Maisonti, “A Proposal to Address the Emerging Muslim Separatist 
Problem in Thailand,” 22. 
127 Suhrke, “Loyalists and Separatists,” 244. 
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disbelievers are one’s own relatives or parents.  The 
booklet refers to disbelievers in numerous passages: 
Do not feel sorry for them, and love them, for 
they are your most dangerous enemy today … and 
the punishment that they receive from Allah in 
the Hereafter is hell at the lowest level.  Know 
that they are no longer your relatives and 
parents … let us come together to fight and 
eradicate them until we are safe from their 
disturbances.128 
Allah has stated clearly to the believers that on 
the surface they may appear as our parents and 
relatives but the truth is they are no longer 
among us … slaughter and kill the disbelievers 
until they are defeated.129 
Group Purification.  There is no significant evidence 
that substantiates the group purification indicator’s 
propensity for violence.  However, both the booklet 
Berjihad Di Pattani and an interview with Professor 
Surachart from Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok provide 
some evidential insights into this indicator.  Surachart 
says that the Thai Muslim insurgents view themselves as 
“good” Muslims and will not associate with Muslims they 
view as “bad” Muslims, particularly Muslims associated with 
the state, such as the Monarch-appointed spiritual leader 
for all Thai Muslims.  Their rationale is that Thai Muslims 
who associate with or support the state have become part of 
the government and, hence, part of the problem.130 
Link to Violent Islamists.  International Islamist 
groups such as Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya have operated 
                     128 Gunaratna and others, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern 
Thailand, 126. 
129 Ibid., 137-39. 
130 Author interview conducted on 31 January 2007.  Groups of Muslims 
exist elsewhere in Thailand such as Muslims of Chinese ancestry in 
Northern Thailand and ethnic-Thai Muslims in Central Thailand. 
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out of Thailand for years.  Some Thai Muslims are suspected 
of receiving support and training from these and other 
groups in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Libya, the Philippines, 
and Syria; however, no solid links have been established 
between them.131  Gunaratna and others suggest that the 
booklet Berjihad Di Pattani is not in line with 
international jihadist ideology, although some insurgents 
have been observed using tactics specifically associated 
with a prominent external Islamist group, which indicates 
that a link may exist between the groups.132 
In 2005, a rare interview was conducted with one of 
the few, if not the only, publicly known separatist 
leaders.  Dr. Wan Kadir Che Man, who has been the head of 
the Patani Bersatu movement since 1998, is living in exile 
in Sweden.  Che Man claims that external violent Islamist 
groups like Al Qaeda have neither influenced nor supported 
their cause.  According to Che Man, 
They [Thai Muslims] do not want this Islamic 
heritage to be compromised by the Thai 
government, nor by foreign Arab influences.  This 
is why the Patani Malays tend to reject Arab or 
Indian Muslim missionary groups that have tried 
to come to teach us Islam, and why Patanis are 
not receptive to Arab-Wahhabi influences or even 
other schools of thought like the Shias, etc. 
Patani Muslims have a strong cultural reaction to 
outsiders, and we do not like being treated like 
second-class Muslims by foreign Muslims, 
                     131 See Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of 
Terror, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 171-72; Andrew D. W. Forbes, 
“Thailand’s Muslim Minorities: Assimilation, Secession, or 
Coexistence?” Asian Survey 22, no. 11 (November 1982), 1063; Gilquin, 
The Muslims of Thailand, 96; and Joseph Chinyong Liow, “The Security 
Situation in Southern Thailand: Toward an Understanding of Domestic and 
International Dimensions,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27 (2004), 
537-38. 
132 Author interview with a Thai military officer speaking on 
condition of anonymity. 
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especially from the Arabs. Based on this, it is 
not that easy for outsiders to come and try to 
influence us on matters of Islam , our beliefs or 
struggle.133 
Perception of New State Policies.  Separatist groups’ 
perceptions of new state policies have had a direct bearing 
on the propensity for violence against the state in 
Thailand.  Three aspects of Thailand’s government policies 
show evidence of a connection between the violence and this 
indicator: the decisions of Prime Minister Thaksin, pondok 
reform, and Thailand’s support for the U.S. global war on 
terrorism. 
The 1990s was a period of relative peace in Southern 
Thailand.  Upon taking office in 2001, Prime Minister 
Thaksin viewed this peace as an end to the separatist 
movement in Southern Thailand.  As a result, on May 1, 
2002, he closed two key organizations: the Southern Border 
Provincial Administration Center (SBPAC) and the Civilian 
Police Military Task Force 43 (CPM 43).  The SBPAC was a 
Ministry of the Interior conflict-resolution agency with 
representatives from Bangkok, the local community, and the 
religious community.  It was highly effective in resolving 
local complaints, identifying and transferring corrupt 
government officials, and covertly gathering intelligence 
on separatist groups.  The CPM 43 was a governmental inter-
agency task force that coordinated the action and 
information flow among government, law enforcement, and 
military personnel operating in Southern Thailand.  It was  
 
                     133 Farish A. Noor, “Interview with Wan Kadir Che Man, Head of the 
Patani Bersatu Movement in Thailand,” The American Muslim, 
http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/interview_with_w
an_kadir_che_man_head_of_the_patani_bersatu_movement_in_tha/ (accessed 
on April 27, 2007). 
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the infrastructure for governance in the southern 
provinces.134  Both agencies were highly respected and 
trusted by the Thai Muslims. 
Thaksin’s decision to close the agencies eliminated 
the Thai Muslims’ main institution for grievance resolution 
and weakened the government’s ability to curtail corruption 
and develop coordinated responses to internal threats.  The 
fallout from his decisions heightened the Thai Muslims’ 
distrust of the government.  One Islamic teacher commented 
that Thai Muslims now “can trust no one except themselves 
for their own security.  The state is not helping them, but 
is threatening them.”135  Author Joseph Liow claims that 
popular opinion in Southern Thailand attributes the ongoing 
situation to Thaksin’s failed approach and the government’s 
lack of internal coordination.136 
In the 1960s, the Thai government viewed the pondoks 
as breeding grounds for young separatists; in recent years 
they have been viewed as breeding grounds for young 
jihadists.  Various Thai governments, including Thaksin’s, 
have attempted to incorporate these unregulated, village-
based religious schools into the Thai Ministry of 
Education.  Most recently, Thaksin’s administration began a 
program to register all pondoks and their teachers and to 
enforce a state approved curriculum.137  The pondoks are 
                     134 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand,” 33-35. 
135 Joseph Chinyong Liow, “International Jihad and Muslim Radicalism 
in Thailand?  Toward an Alternative Interpretation,” Asia Policy, no. 2 
(July 2006), 105. 
136 Ibid. 
137 “Southern Unrest: Sirichai admits he’s in the dark,” The Nation 
(Bangkok), October 8, 2004.  Pondoks teach rote memorization of Islamic 
studies in Malay and Arabic languages to children between the ages of 
five to thirteen years old.  Historical they do not have a centralized 
curriculum nor do they issue state recognized diplomas. 
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prized by the Thai Muslims for their teaching of Islamic 
values and are a symbol of resistance against government 
intrusion into their religion.138  “Religious schools are 
more than educational institutes—for the Malay-Muslims of 
southern Thailand, they are a bastion of history and 
identity.”139  Hence, the Thaksin administration’s suspicion 
of the pondok’s role in the separatist conflict was a major 
policy blunder that “did little more than further incite 
disenchantment toward central authority and feed the flames 
of separatism.”140 
Thailand implemented several new state policies in 
support of the U.S. global war on terrorism, many of which 
are viewed with suspicion by the Thai Muslims.  A series of 
policies and decisions in 2003 in particular evoked their 
concern.  In March, Thailand expelled Iraqi diplomats from 
Bangkok.  In June, Thailand signed an agreement that 
exempted Americans from the International Court of Justice 
and later arrested four members of the Jemaah Islamiya 
terrorist group, including Hambali, a key Al Qaeda planner 
in Southeast Asia.  In September, Thailand sent troops to 
Iraq and, in October, President Bush designated Thailand a 
major non-NATO ally.  This improved the flow of military 
aid and facilitated free-trade agreements.141  Liow says the 
perception among former separatists whom he interviewed is 
that “The American invasion of Iraq and Thailand’s support 
of that invasion has had negative repercussions in the 
south, where protests and boycotts of American products                      138 Gunaratna and others, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern 
Thailand, 48-49. 
139 Liow, Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern 
Philippines, 33. 
140 Ibid., 33-34. 
141 Gilquin, The Muslims of Thailand, 133-34. 
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were launched in response….  [Some Muslims] felt the 
Thaksin government was complicit in Washington’s “attack” 
on Islam.”142 
State Use of Violence.  The Thai government has long 
used violence indiscriminately against random Thai Muslims 
as well as targeting specific Thai Muslim individuals.  
Separatist groups have reciprocated in the use of violence 
as a result of these government actions.  The most 
significant event occurred on April 28, 1948 in Dusun Nyiur 
when frustrations peaked and police and Thai Muslims 
clashed, resulting in the deaths of 1,100 Muslims and 30 
police officers.143  On the anniversary of that date in 
2004, over 100 insurgents simultaneously attacked eleven 
police locations in Southern Thailand, an attack that ended 
in a bloody shoot-out at the Krue Se mosque. 
The Thai government is suspected of being responsible 
for the disappearance and deaths of thousands of Thais, 
both Muslims and Buddhists.  In 2003, Thailand’s war on 
drugs gave police and local officials extraordinary 
latitude to deal with drug dealers and drug smugglers.  
Nationwide, over the course of seven months, between two to 
three thousand people were killed and 70,000 arrested.144  
Thailand’s porous southern border has long been a hotbed 
for drug smuggling activity.  Since many of these 
extrajudicial killings occurred in Southern Thailand, some 
Thai Muslims suspect that local authorities used the war on 
                     142 Liow, Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern 
Philippines, 45. 
143 Maisonti, “A Proposal to Address the Emerging Muslim Separatist 
Problem in Thailand,” 19. 
144 Human Rights Watch, “Not Enough Graves: The War on Drugs, 
HIV/AIDS, and Violations of Human Rights,” Human Rights Watch 16, no. 8 
(June 2004), 9. 
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drugs as an opportunity to attack and kill Thai Muslims.145  
These suspicions were confirmed in April 2006 when the 
Chief of the Thai Army admitted the existence of 
“blacklists” used to target suspected insurgents and 
Islamic religious teachers.  One such list contained the 
names of over three hundred people who had since been 
killed, many of whose deaths occurred under questionable 
circumstances.146 
 
C. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Based on this case study of Southern Thailand, Table 3 
summarizes the values determined for each indicator of 
potential violence, its predicted relationship to the 
propensity for violence, and its actual relevance to the 
propensity for violence.  Of the eleven indicators of 
violence, or independent variables, a total of eight 
indicators occurred and led to the dependent variable, that 
is, the likelihood that an Islamist group would resort to 
separatist violence against the state.  Three of the 
indicators of violence did not occur and are, therefore, 
inconclusive for this case study.  The eight indicators 
that occurred are Political Representation, Societal 
Alienation, Past Use of Violence, Religious Revival, 
Radical Group Ideology, Group Justification for Violence, 
Perception of New State Policies, and State Use of 
Violence.  The three indicators that did not occur are 
Exclusionary State Regime, Group Purification, and Link to 
Violent Islamists. 
 
                     145 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand,” 35-36. 
146 “Army chief admits agencies are using ‘blacklists’ in South,” The 
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1. Political Representation -Under-represented -High + 
2. Societal Alienation -High on all factors -Highest + 
3. Past Use of Violence -Yes -High + 
4. State Regime Type -Inclusionary -Low - 
5. Religious Revival -Yes -High + 
6. Group Ideology -Radical -High + 
7. Group Justification of Violence -Violence and hatred justified -Highest + 
8. Group Purification -No -Low - 
9. Link to Violent Islamists -None -Low - 
10. Perception of New State Policies -Discriminatory and unfair -High + 
11. State Use of Violence -Indiscriminate -Highest + 
  
Table 3.   Indicators of Violence: Thailand Case Study 
61 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This chapter combines the findings of the two case 
studies and refines the framework of indicators of 
potential violence.  The first section compares the 
findings of the case studies and discusses a new indicator 
that was revealed by both case studies.  It also presents a 
new framework of indicators that may signal the likelihood 
that an Islamist group will resort to separatist violence 
against the state.  The second section describes two policy 
implications revealed by the data in the framework. 
 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Table 4 combines the findings of the two case studies.  
Both cases revealed four relevant indicators of potential 
violence: Political Representation, Societal Alienation, 
Religious Revival, and Perception of New State Policies.  





Case Study: Relevant 
(+) or Irrelevant (-) 
Southern Thailand 
Case Study: Relevant 




1. Political Representation + + Relevant 
2. Societal Alienation + + Relevant 
3. Past Use of Violence - + Inconclusive 
4. State Regime Type - - Irrelevant 
5. Religious Revival + + Relevant 
6. Group Ideology - + Inconclusive 
7. Group Justification of Violence - + Inconclusive 
8. Group Purification + - Inconclusive 
9. Link to Violent Islamists + - Inconclusive 
10. Perception of New State Policies + + Relevant 
11. State Use of Violence - + Inconclusive 
 
 





1. Relevant Indicators 
A common picture emerges from the two case studies.  
Historically, both Filipino Muslims and Thai Muslims were 
members of independent polities that are now a regionally 
concentrated minority groups in a predominantly non-Muslim 
country.  Both groups view the state government as 
illegitimate.  For over a hundred years, both groups have 
suffered social injustice and repression at the hands of 
the government.  Although token political representation 
was possible through the electoral system, the Muslim 
masses viewed the elected officials as elites co-opted by 
the government.  More important, both groups were excluded 
from any employment opportunities in the local bureaucracy 
through which they might have effected change.  Thus, the 
cultural, political, and socio-economic deprivations in 
both the Philippines and Thailand became preconditions ripe 
for the emergence of separatist movements.  And the states’ 
failure to address those concerns furthered the separatist 
cause.147 
One of the indicators of potential or coming violence 
that was common to both case studies was the occurrence of 
a fundamentalist religious revivalism.  This revivalism 
resulted, in both the Philippines and Thailand, in the 
groups self-identifying in ways that set them apart from 
the majority group.  It also provided both Filipino Muslims 
and Thai Muslims with a new perspective on their place and 
role in society and a new interpretation of the 
deprivations they suffered.  “It is in this respect that 
religion is employed to reinforce apprehension toward the 
                     147 Islam, “The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand 
and Mindanao of the Philippines,” 455. 
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state.”148  Indeed, as both case studies show, it was the 
Muslim groups’ perception of state policies as 
discriminatory and unfair that precipitated their 
separatist violence.  The states’ policies were insensitive 
to the groups’ needs, denying them the “recognition as 
representing a separate religion and culture”149  that is 
essential to the mutual coexistence of diverse societal 
communities.  Instead, the state policies heightened the 
alienated groups’ already high sense of deprivation and 
religious disparity. 
 
2. Inconclusive Indicators 
A comparison of the two case studies revealed a total 
of six indicators that were relevant in either one case 
study or the other, but not in both: Past Use of Violence, 
Group Ideology, Group Justification of Violence, Group 
Purification, Link to Violent Islamists, and State Use of 
Violence.  This absence of mutuality between the two 
studies means that their indicators’ relevance as portents 
of potential violence could not be conclusively determined.  
Thus, they were eliminated from the refined framework.  In 
addition, one indicator, State Regime Type, proved to be 
irrelevant in both case studies and thus was also 
eliminated from the refined framework. 
The thesis concludes, therefore, that further research 
that might prove more fruitful is required to evaluate the 
relevance of the six indicators determined here as 
inconclusive.  Case studies of similar group situations 
that resulted in either separatist violence against the                      148 Liow, Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern 
Philippines, 53. 
149 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 380. 
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state or nonviolent political solutions might better 
determine the relevance of these indicators.  For example, 
two potential case studies of similar group situations that 
resulted in separatist violence are the Kashmiri Muslims in 
India and the Chechen rebels in Russia.  Two potential case 
studies of similar situations that resulted in nonviolent 
political solutions are the Sri Lankan Muslims in the mid 
1980s in Sri Lanka and the Sandzak Muslims in Yugoslavia in 
the early 1990s.150 
However, one of the indicators discussed herein that 
proved inconclusive—state use of violence—is of particular 
concern.  The state government in both the Philippines and 
Thailand used violence against the Muslim community.  And 
in both countries, the use of state violence played a 
critical role in the actions and reactions of the Islamist 
groups.  But what is most interesting is that the state 
violence was not a “catalyst” for a violent response in 
either country.  Thus, further research may determine 
whether this indicator is a “signal” of a group’s 
propensity for violence. 
 
3. Discovery of a New Indicator of Potential 
Violence 
In the course of the thesis evaluation of the two case 
studies, a new, unanticipated indicator of potential 
separatist violence emerged in both studies, in the form of 
a “precondition”—the geographic concentration of the Muslim 
population.  Both the Filipino Muslims and the Thai Muslims 
expressed an overwhelming desire to establish an 
                     150 These conflicts are mentioned in the report by Ted Robert Gurr et 
al, Peace and Conflict, 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-
Determination Movements, and Democracy (College Park, Md.: Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management, 2005). 
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independent Islamic state.  And both groups’ geographic 
concentration made secession not only an attractive but 
also a somewhat feasible option.  Had either or both of the 
two groups been dispersed throughout their respective 
countries, however, separatism would not have been an 
option. 
In regard to groups’ geographic concentration as a 
precondition for separatist movements, the Israeli scholar 
and diplomat Moshe Yegar offers a somewhat pessimistic and 
primordialist view: “by their very nature, Muslim 
populations in Southeast Asia are unable to be absorbed 
into the majority culture because they will not adapt to 
non-Muslim rule.”151  “[G]enerally,” Yegar continues, “the 
members of a Muslim minority community living in a non-
Muslim state will be outsiders in many respects and will 
cultivate separatist notions, either more moderate or more 
radical, depending on the historic circumstances.”152  These 
ideas support the thesis argument that geographic 
concentration as a precondition is another possible 
indicator of a Muslim separatist groups’ propensity for 
violence. 
Geographic concentration is an objective measurement 
derived from census data and similar records.  A Muslim 
group is considered geographically concentrated if the 
majority of its population resides in the same region.  
They do not need to be the majority population, however.  
For instance, the vast majority of Filipino Muslims live on 
Mindanao, but overall, they comprise only 17 percent of the 
population on Mindanao.  Therefore, Filipino Muslims are a 
                     151 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 382. 
152 Ibid., 365. 
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geographically concentrated group even though they are not 
the majority group in the region.  In contrast, Sri Lankan 
Muslims, which as a group are dispersed throughout the 
nation, are a majority in some regions.  Hence, in Sri 
Lanka, Muslims are considered a geographically dispersed 
group.153 
 
4. Refinement of the Basic Framework 
The thesis summary of the case study findings, with 
the addition of the newly detected indicator of potential 
violence, yielded a new, refined framework of possible 
indicators of Muslim groups’ propensity for violence.  The 
revised framework, in Table 5, now shows a total of five 
indicators: Political Representation, Societal Alienation, 
Geographic Concentration, Religious Revival, and Perception 
of New State Policies. 
 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The policy implications from the framework of 
indicators are especially pertinent for use by U.S. 
Military Regional Affairs Officers (RAO), the targeted 
reader of this thesis.  One of an RAO’s primary 
responsibilities is to assess the potential threats in a 
given country or region and then brief policy makers such 
as senior military officers or Department of Defense 
officials.  Such information is vital for formulating U.S. 
foreign policy, because a potential for separatist violence 
                     153 Muslims comprise only 7 percent of Sri Lanka’s population; 35 
percent live in the northeast; the other 65 percent is dispersed 
throughout the country (Library of Congress Web site, “Regional Map of 
Ethnic Groups and Religion,” 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sri_lanka/lk02_02b.pdf)(accessed on May 
12, 2007). 
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would have serious security and humanitarian implications 
that could affect the entire region.  The framework 
presented here illustrates patterns that could help the RAO 
determine if an Islamist group is likely to resort to 
separatist violence against the state.  Two policy 
implications arise from the outcome of this framework. 
 
Indicator Description Values Propensity 
for Violence 
Preconditions:    
1. Political 
Representation 
The degree of representation in 
politics and the local bureaucracy. 
-Underrepresented 
-Proportionate or overrepresented 
-High 
-Low 






The degree of societal alienation of 
the group from the dominant group 
of the state caused by differences in 
language, race, culture, religion, or 
education. 
-Alienation on all factors 
-Alienation on several factors 
-Minor alienation on a few factors 







The geographic concentration of the 





Signals:    






Catalytic events:    
5. Perception of New 
State Policies 








Table 5.   Revised Framework for the Indicators of 
Potential Violence 
 
1. Response to an Islamist Group’s Religious Revival 
When an Islamist group experiences a religious 
revival, it creates a new cleavage between the group and 
the society as a whole and thus heightens the likelihood of 
future violence.  In response, therefore, the RAO for that 
country or area should take two specific actions.  First, 
the RAO should advise higher, adjacent, and subordinate 
commands and agencies of the heightened potential for 
violence so they can take appropriate action, given their 
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responsibilities.  Second, the RAO should research the 
group’s ongoing reactions to any political events, pending 
legislation, or recently enacted state policies.  If 
neither the leaders nor members of the group have spoken 
publicly about such events, the RAO should consult with 
intelligence sources in an effort to assess the group’s 
perception of those events. 
 
2. Response to an Islamist Group’s State Criticism 
If an Islamist group publicly criticizes a state 
policy or action as being discriminatory toward the group, 
or if the RAO determines that such a perception exists 
among members of the group, the RAO should immediately 
advise higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands and 
agencies of the likelihood of near-future or immediate 
violence by the group.  When such situations develop, RAOs 
should also be especially watchful for possible rallies, 
protests, or demonstrations that might provide a convenient 
environment for an eruption of violence.  Likewise, RAOs 
should use available sources to track any paramilitary 
branch or militia affiliated with the group.  Movements 
involving such units may indicate a possible attack. 
 
C. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK 
Appendix A is a guide that RAOs can use to assess the 
propensity for separatist violence against the state by an 
Islamist group in the RAO’s regional area of 
responsibility.  The guide includes a three-step process 
for applying the framework, the revised framework of 
indicators, and a narrative for measuring each indicator. 
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APPENDIX A. A GUIDE TO THE INDICATORS OF VIOLENCE 
Appendix A is a stand-alone guide designed to assist 
Military Regional Affairs Officers (RAO) in the assessment 
of Islamist groups in their area of responsibility in 
regards to the groups’ propensity for separatist violence 
against the state.  The guide includes a three-step process 
for applying the framework of indicators of violence and a 
narrative for measuring each indicator. 
 
A. THREE-STEP PROCESS 
The three-step process consists of conducting 
background research upon assuming a RAO billet and 
continuing actions throughout the tour of duty.  Use a 
separate framework worksheet (see Table 6) for each 
Islamist group assessment.  RAOs should attach detailed 
notes to the each worksheet because this assessment is a 
long-term approach and these notes will facilitate an 
accurate turnover and continuation of the assessment as 
personnel rotations occur. 
The three steps in this process are: 1) conduct an 
initial assessment of all Islamist groups in the region or 
country of responsibility, 2) determine which groups have 
undergone a religious revival, and 3) assess the reactions 
of those groups to any new state policies.  Table 6 shows 
the five indicators of potential violence for this three-
step process.  The following sections explain this process 
in detail.  Included in the narrative are six corollary 
indicators that are not necessary conditions required for 
violence to occur, but whose presence amplifies the five 
indicators of potential violence. 
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1. Conduct an Initial Regional Assessment 
Depending on service branch and billet assignment, a 
RAO may be responsible for a country or for an entire 
region.  Upon assuming the assignment, a RAO’s first 
responsibility, the first step, is to become familiar with 
all the known Islamist groups in the area.  To achieve 
this, research the historical background of both the group 
and, more important, the Muslim population from which the 
group draws its members.  Understanding how Islam was 
introduced to and spread in the area will help a RAO to 
also understand the current situation.  Once you understand 
the historical background of the Muslim community as a 
whole, focus more specifically on the period of time that 
led up to the formation of the Islamist group.  To 
determine whether a group manifests an increased propensity 
for violence, look for evidence of three specific 
“precondition” indicators: a lack of political 
representation, a high degree of societal alienation, and a 
geographically concentrated Muslim population. 
The following sections describe how to measure the 
three indicators.  After completing the background 
research, circle the appropriate value and corresponding 
propensity for violence in Table 6 on the framework 
worksheet.  If the group ranks high for all three 
indicators, continue to step two, determining whether a 
religious revival has occurred.  If the group ranks low or 
mid-value for all three indicators, check periodically for 





a. Political Representation 
The determination of the presence and extent of 
political representation as an indicator of potential 
violence is a purely objective process.  It is based on a 
given group’s percentage of the population either in a 
specific region or in the entire country, or both, 
depending on the political system.  In this process, both 
elected and government-appointed political positions—for 
example, cabinet members and provincial governors—are 
considered, because both are forms of political 
representation.  To measure this indicator, compare the 
population demographics of the country and individual 
regions to the demographics of the elected and government-
appointed national and regional officials. 
 
Indicator Description Values Propensity 
for Violence 
Preconditions:    
1. Political 
Representation 
The degree of representation in 
politics and the local bureaucracy. 
-Underrepresented 
-Proportionate or overrepresented 
-High 
-Low 






The degree of societal alienation of 
the group from the dominant group 
of the state caused by differences in 
language, race, culture, religion, or 
education. 
-Alienation on all factors 
-Alienation on several factors 
-Minor alienation on a few factors 







The geographic concentration of the 





Signals:    






Catalytic events:    
5. Perception of New 
State Policies 















b. Societal Alienation 
The determination of societal alienation as an 
indicator of potential violence begins with the assumption 
that it is not caused by differences in language, race, 
culture, religion, or education, in and of themselves.  
Rather, societal alienation is assumed caused by the 
negative affects of those differences on the interaction 
between the dominant group and a given subject group in the 
society under discussion.  Specifically, it is the subject 
group’s perceptions of the interactions that provide a true 
measure of this violence indicator. 
For example, if a group perceives the linguistic 
differences between it and the dominant group in the 
society as a barrier between them, societal alienation will 
result, whether the language differences are actually a 
barrier or not.  To measure this indicator, determine what 
differences exist in the language, race, culture, religion, 
and education between the dominant group and the Muslim 
group; and how these differences preclude Muslims from the 
rights or privileges of the dominant group.  Determine if 
laws prohibit expression of the Muslims’ identity.  For 
example, are headscarves illegal to wear or is the Muslims’ 
native language prohibited in public?  Determine if Muslims 
are excluded from higher education because of requirements 
not readily obtainable, for example, fluency of the 
dominant group’s language.  Lastly, to confirm racial 
discrimination, determine if non-Muslims of the same race 
as the Muslim group face discrimination based on their 
shared physically appearance.  When available, public 
opinion poll data provides evidence of the actual 
perceptions of alienation. 
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c. Geographic Concentration 
Geographic concentration is an objective 
measurement derived from census data and similar records.  
A Muslim group is considered geographically concentrated if 
the majority of its population resides in the same region.  
They do not need to be the majority population, however.  
For instance, the vast majority of Filipino Muslims live on 
Mindanao, but overall, they comprise only 17 percent of the 
population on Mindanao.  Therefore, Filipino Muslims are a 
geographically concentrated group even though they are not 
the majority group in the region.  In contrast, Sri Lankan 
Muslims, which as a group are dispersed throughout the 
nation, are a majority in some regions.  Hence, in Sri 
Lanka, Muslims are considered a geographically dispersed 
group.154 
 
d. Corollary Precondition: Past Use of Violence 
by the Group 
A group’s past use of violence against the state 
or other entities could heighten its future use of 
violence.  The central question here is whether the group 
has taken responsibility for a violent action in the past 
or been reasonably suspected of violence.  Look at past 
incidences of violence by the group, and ask: How recent is 
the use of violence?  Was it intended?  What degree of 
violence was used?  For suspected incidences of violence, 
seek out unbiased sources of information whenever possible. 
                      154 Muslims comprise only 7 percent of Sri Lanka’s population; 35 
percent live in the northeast; the other 65 percent is dispersed 
throughout the country (Library of Congress Web site, “Regional Map of 
Ethnic Groups and Religion,” 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sri_lanka/lk02_02b.pdf)(accessed on May 
12, 2007). 
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2. Determine if a Religious Revival has Occurred 
A religious revival is a group’s return to what it 
perceives as the fundamentals of its professed religion in 
order to seek changes in society and government from below.  
The group’s ultimate purpose is to create a religion-based 
society.  Religious revivalists seek a self-defining 
identity, political and social authenticity, and community.  
They fault the impact of colonialism, the injustice of 
despotic governments, the entrenched elites, and, often, 
the religious establishment.  They seek a return to the 
foundation or cornerstones of faith; emphasize the primacy 
of divine sovereignty and the equality of all within the 
community; and see religion as a total way of life.155 
Determining whether a religious revival has taken 
place is an objective process that can be difficult to 
measure.  The ideal situation for measuring this indicator 
is the existence of scholarly literature on the religious 
revivalism of a subject group.  Lacking such literature, 
such measurement can be based on newspaper articles, 
speeches by group leaders, or communiqués from the group. 
An Islamic religious revival may signal the 
development of a further cleavage between an Islamist group 
and the rest of society, and thus may heighten the 
propensity for violence.  Thus, when an Islamist group 
undergoes a religious revival, the RAO should take two 
specific actions.  First, advise higher, adjacent, and 
subordinate commands and agencies about the heightened 
potential for violence, so they can take appropriate 
actions based on their respective responsibilities.  
Second, proceed to the final step of the three-step 
                     155 Esposito, "Religion and Global Affairs," 21-24. 
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process: assess the group’s reaction to any political 
events, pending legislation, or recently enacted government 
policies. 
 
a. Corollary Signal: Radical Group Ideology 
The adjective “radical” describes the ideology 
adopted by a group.  Islamist groups with a radical 
ideology work outside the political system and may use 
inflammatory anti-state rhetoric or engage in violence in 
order to destabilize or overthrow the government.  In 
contrast, Islamist groups with a “moderate” ideology work 
within the political system and form legitimate political 
parties in order to achieve their goals. 
 
b. Corollary Signal: Group Justification for 
Violence 
An Islamist group that condones either hatred or 
violence, or both, against other Muslims or Islamists 
signifies that the group will let no obstacles stand 
between it and its goal.  This corollary signal is 
evidenced by speeches from group leaders or communiqués 
from the group.  Easy access to weapons heightens the 
probability that a group’s justification of violence is a 
corollary signal of potential violence. 
 
c. Corollary Signal: Group Purification 
Group purification is a process in which a group 
narrows its membership to include only those members who 
share the same ideology and level of commitment.  It 
signifies that the group is becoming narrowly exclusive.  
An exclusive organization has strict membership 
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requirements, imposes a high level of discipline, requires 
a great deal of personal commitment, and “permeates all 
sections of the member’s life, including activities with 
non-members.”156  Evidence of this corollary signal is 
largely dependent on published interviews with current or 
former group members or leaders, or scholarly literature or 
intelligence reports on the subject group. 
 
d. Corollary Signal: Link to a Violent Islamist 
Group 
There are a number of ways that an Islamist group 
can have links to a violent Islamist group.  The links can 
be in the form of financial, moral, or training support, or 
assistance in the execution of violent acts.  Such links 
are evidenced by researching news coverage, media 
assessments, interrogation reports, and interviews of group 
members.  In addition, links can be gleaned by comparing 
the speeches, communiqués, tactics, and strategies of the 
subject group and external violent Islamist groups. 
 
3. Assess Reactions to New State Policies 
If an Islamist group perceives a new state policy as 
discriminatory or unfair to their group, the enactment of 
the policy may act as a trigger or catalytic event leading 
to separatist violence against the state.  In addition to 
new state policies, the RAO should consider such things as 
campaign promises during elections, newly introduced 
legislation, unilaterally imposed laws, referendum votes, 
and political speeches as potential triggers of violence, 
because they can contribute to the already heightened sense 
                     156 Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, 109-10. 
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of deprivation of an oppressed and polarized group.  And 
the ensuing sense of hopelessness and despair may lead them 
to believe that violence is their only option.  This step 
assumes that the Islamist group has the physical and 
material capability, such as weapons, necessary to conduct 
violence. 
Measuring this indicator requires access to the 
subject group’s written or verbal responses to the state’s 
adoption or declaration of state policies.  Since this 
indicator is a matter of perception, its measurement hinges 
on the group leaders’ speaking out on the issues.  Without 
their publicly stated views, it may still be possible to 
gauge the opinions of the group members, but it will be 
more difficult.  Mass protests will provide ample evidence 
of this indicator. 
If an Islamist group publicly criticizes a state 
policy or action as being discriminatory toward the group, 
or if the RAO determines that such a perception exists 
among members of the group, the RAO should immediately 
advise higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands and 
agencies of the likelihood of near-future or immediate 
violence by the group.  When such situations develop, RAOs 
should also be especially watchful for possible rallies, 
protests, or demonstrations that might provide a convenient 
environment for an eruption of violence.  Likewise, RAOs 
should use all available sources to closely track any 
paramilitary branch or militia affiliated with the group.  




a. Corollary Catalytic Event: State Use of 
Violence Against the Group 
The suspected or confirmed use of violence by the 
state against specific members of an Islamist group or 
against random members of the Muslim community may result 
in a reciprocal use of violence by an Islamist group.  Only 
consider suspected cases of violence if the group perceives 
that the state was responsible.  In this situation, 
perception can outweigh factuality. 
 
B. FRAMEWORK FOR THE INDICATORS OF POTENTIAL VIOLENCE 
After completing the background research on the three 
preconditions for potential violence, the RAO is ready for 
the next step in the three-step process.  Circle the 
group’s appropriate value and corresponding propensity for 
violence on the framework worksheet.  If the group ranks 
low or medium for all three preconditions, periodically 
check for and assess changes in the preconditions.  If the 
group ranks high on all three preconditions, determine 
whether a religious revival has occurred.  If a religious 
revival has not occurred, continue to monitor for signs of 
such activity.  If or when a religious revival does occur, 
begin assessing the group’s reactions to political events, 
pending legislation, or any recently enacted government 
policies.  A perception by the group that the state’s 
policies are discriminatory of unfair is the final 
indicator of potential separatist violence against the 
state. 
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APPENDIX B. SERVICE REGIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICERS 
This appendix briefly describes the duties of the 
Regional Affairs Officers in each of the four branches of 
service in the U.S. Department of Defense.  The billet 
title and duties vary slightly from service to service.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the term “Regional Affairs 
Officer” (RAO) encompasses all of the positions described 
in this appendix. 
 
A. U.S. ARMY FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICERS 
Foreign Area Officers (FAO) combine professional 
military skills with regional expertise, language 
competency, and military-political awareness.  Their role 
is to use their unique combination of skills to support the 
warfighter and to advance U.S. interests.  Army FAOs 
interact with foreign militaries and other government and 
civilian agencies and groups.  They establish and maintain 
contact with foreign militaries and are often the principal 
overseas representative of the U.S. Army and Department of 
Defense.  Army FAOs are linguists, area experts, and 
political-military affairs specialists.157 
 
B. U.S. NAVY FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICERS 
Foreign Area Officers (FAO) manage and analyze 
political-military activities overseas.  Navy FAOs serve as 
regional specialists on fleet staffs, defense and naval 
attachés, security assistance officers, mobile training 
                     157 http://www.fao.army.mil (accessed on May 7, 2007). 
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team officers, and foreign war college students or 
personnel exchange program officers.158 
 
C. U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICERS 
Regional Affairs Officers in the U.S. Marine Corps use 
their knowledge and understanding of the military forces, 
culture, history, sociology, economics, politics, and 
geography of selected areas of the world to perform duties 
in operations, planning, and intelligence billets.159 
 
D. U.S. AIR FORCE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SPECIALISTS 
The U.S. Air Force International Affairs Specialist 
program consists of two programs: Regional Area Specialists 
and Political-Military Affairs Specialists.  The Regional 
Area Specialists typically serve as staff officers, country 
desk officers, arms control specialists, Foreign Liaison 
Officers, political advisers, security assistance officers, 
and attachés where their unique combination of professional 
military skills, regional expertise, and foreign language 
proficiency are required.  Political-Military Affairs 
Specialists serve in similar positions, but they perform 
duties that require a broad knowledge of political-military 
affairs, rather than regional expertise and foreign 
language skills, to serve effectively in key political-
military positions.160 
                     158 OPNAV Instruction 1301.10B. 
159 Marine Corps Order 1520.11E. 
160 Air Force Instruction 16-109. 
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